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A BRIEF HISTORY
OF THE
SIXTH REGIMENT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

1918



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A brief history of the
Sixth Regiment, United States Marine Corps,
from its organization, July, 1917, to the date
of arrival at its present station at and in the
vicinity of Leutesdorf, Germany, Army of Occu-
pation, December, 1918.



April 19, 1904

Dear Mr. A. J. Smith:

I have just received your letter of the 14th inst. and am glad to hear that you are interested in the work of the American Museum of Natural History.

A brief history of the Sixth Regiment, United States Marine Corps, from its organization, July, 1917, to the date of its arrival at its present station at and in the vicinity of LEUTESDORF, Germany, Army of Occupation, December, 1918.

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Although the formation of the Sixth Regiment of Marines was contemplated when it was decided to send a brigade of Marines to France. and preliminary plans were made, the work of assembling the units and of molding them into an efficient fighting body was not begun until the latter part of July, 1917. A site for a training camp had been purchased the previous spring by the Navy Department at Quantico, Virginia, and it was there that the Marines destined for overseas service with the American Expeditionary Forces were to be mobilized and receive their last intensive training in the new methods of warfare.

The construction of an up-to-date cantonment to accommodate some ten thousand Marines was only well under way when the first elements of the Sixth Regiment began training during the last days of July and the first part of August. Only a comparatively few wooden barracks had been completed at that time. Consequently it was necessary to regulate the induction of new companies into Quantico by the speed with which the barracks were put in readiness for occupation. However, by the middle of August the regiment had attained approximately three quarters of its strength in enlisted personnel, but there was a serious shortage of officers of lower grades. This need became urgent and a demand was made upon the officers' training school in Quantico for a number of lieutenants for immediate duty with companies with more to be supplied from time to time. Here a problem presented itself, the course of instruction in the officers' school had started on July 30th, 1917, and was to cover a period of three months. Were these new officers then, some with little experience, many with none at all, and all young in the service, fit for assignment to duty with troops after receiving but three weeks of schooling? Among these new officers was a number of old noncommissioned officers who, without further delay, were assigned for duty with the Sixth Regiment and the 1st Machine Gun Battalion, later to be designated and to function as the 6th Machine Gun Battalion of the Second Division. There were other junior officers who were graduates of military academies, some who had received military training at college prior to enrolling in the Marine Corps, others who had formerly been members of the National Guard, and a few former members of the Marine Corps who had returned to the service to take an active part in the war. The required number to fill the complement of the regiment was drawn from these available sources. Many of these were, indeed, comparatively new to the service yet they had an eagerness to learn, a desire to serve, and a keenness to reach France to fight; these qualities more than compensated for any short-comings in the matter of experience.

Toward the latter part of August, 1917, after the 95th, 96th and 97th Companies, composed largely of recruits from the recruit depot at Parris Island, South Carolina, had arrived, the regiment attained war strength, both in men and officers. Colonel Albertus W. Catlin, who commanded the post until the arrival of Brigadier General Lejeune, was in command of the regiment, with Lieut. Colonel Harry Lee second in command and Major Frank E. Evans as Regimental Adjutant. Captain Henry L. Manney, soon to be made Major, was Regimental Quartermaster. Major (Surgeon) Wrey C. Farwell, U.S.N., was Regimental Surgeon. Chaplain James D. MacNair was Regimental Chaplain. Major John A. Hughes commanded the 1st Battalion; Major Thomas Holcomb the 2nd; and Major Berton W. Sibley the 3rd. The regiment was composed of the following units: 1st Battalion - 74th, 75th, 76th and 95th Companies; 2nd Battalion - 78th, 79th, 80th and 96th Companies; 3rd Battalion - 82nd, 83rd, 84th and 97th Companies; Headquarters Detachment - Headquarters, Supply and Regimental Machine Gun (73rd) Companies. The company commanders were for the most part

captains who had served ten years, slightly more or less, in the Marine Corps, and whose experience counted greatly in developing confidence and initiative in the younger and newer company officers under them. They had come to Quantico from the island stations, from China, from sea duty, and from various Navy yards and posts in the United States. So, also, had come a small nucleus of noncommissioned officers and men, who were distributed judiciously throughout the regiment to form the backbone of the companies, around which was to be developed the body and spirit of the fighting outfit made famous later by its exploits in the battles near Chateau Thierry, Soissons, St. Mihiel and the Champagne and Argonne-Meuse sectors. Among the noncommissioned officers of proved ability were John H. Quick, Regimental Sergeant Major, Daniel O'Brien, 1st Sergeant of the Headquarters Company, and Daniel Daly, 1st Sergeant of the 73rd Regimental Machine Gun Company, each of whom had served in the Marine Corps for over fifteen years and had participated in almost every campaign upon which the Corps had embarked in that time. A large part of the rank and file consisted of new recruits who had enlisted after the United States entered the war; a young, eager, virile lot of men anxious to fit themselves to fight and go to France as soon as possible. No small percentage of these recruits was college men, a fair proportion was made up of young business men who had left lucrative positions to enlist, and there was also a sprinkling throughout the regiment of men who had already put in one or two years service prior to the entry of the United States in the world war. The whole presented a most remarkable personnel, which needed only training to produce the coordination and efficiency which formed the basis of the morale and fighting stamina later displayed in battle.

By September 1st the training was well under way. The month of August had been in a general way the period of organization. Regular drills and exercises were held by each company after it had been completely organized; battalion parades were undertaken but it was not until the end of the month that each battalion had its full quota of companies and each company its full quota of officers. A regular routine of training was carried out, including close and extended order drill and the manual of arms, which were intended to develop self-confidence in the men and precision in each separate unit. The men were given actual instruction in constructing trenches of various types and erecting barbed wire entanglements. Each battalion had one day's trench construction out of three. The other two days were used for drills and for instruction in throwing hand grenades and the latest bayonet exercises. Practice marches and simple maneuvers were held. The rolling, woody country around Quantico was ideal for these maneuvers. On September 5th the Preparedness Parade was held in Washington, D. C., in which this regiment was represented. President Wilson reviewed this parade. In the meantime light machine guns of the Lewis type had been issued and instruction was given daily in their operation by Major Edward B. Cole and his assistants. A temporary range was constructed for this purpose and practical demonstrations were made. Each infantry platoon was equipped with two of these Lewis guns.

Early on the morning of Sunday, September 16, 1917, the entire 1st Battalion, under Major John A. Hughes, left Quantico by train for League Island, Philadelphia, where it was to board a transport for France. The day was dark and it was raining as the men climbed aboard the two long trains. The post band played and as the cars drew away from the station the departing men were given rousing cheers by the members of their regiment who were being left behind. On the night of the 16th the battalion embarked on the U.S.S. Henderson and on the following morning the transport got under way for New York. It arrived there on the morning of September 18th, where it remains for five days, and put to sea at 10:30 P.M. September 23rd. The trip across the Atlantic was uneventful, the men, the majority of whom had never been out of sight of land before, soon accustomed themselves to the new life and routine aboard ship. Experienced men were assigned to man the two batteries of four 5-inch guns each. The

entire guard and all submarine lookouts and watches were furnished by the battalion. Officers of the battalion were assigned to duty as spotters and battery officers. In fact the only work left to the sailors was scrubbing the deck and running the engine. Drill call was sounded twice a day. General quarters and abandon ship drill were a frequent occurrence. The ship was darkened every evening at sunset, no smoking and lights of any kind were allowed. Two full companies were quartered on the decks of the superstructure and the other two companies were assigned spaces below the deck. Hammocks were provided for those who were fortunate enough to get them, but the majority of the new men of the Marine Corps felt it a trifle safer sleeping on the deck. No submarines were sighted on the way over, but on several occasions other ships of the convoy fired at suspicious-looking objects reported by the men on submarine watch. On October 5, 1917, the 1st Battalion of the 6th Regiment, Marine Corps, landed at San Nazaire, France.

The departure of the 1st Battalion quite naturally caused speculation to rise as to who would be the next to go. The 2nd and 3rd battalions went about their daily routines of drill and exercises with renewed determination and increased energy, as did the 73rd and Headquarters companies. Lists of articles required for service in France were issued to officers and rumors of imminent departure were common. The atmosphere was charged with uncertainty and impatience and the question "when do we leave?" was on everyone's lips. With October came colder weather and the business of issuing overcoats and winter-field uniforms to the men was begun. This was accomplished by stages and it was not until the fourth week of October that the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, in view of imminent departure, were completely outfitted with winter clothing and articles of equipment contemplated for overseas service. In the meantime, the 73rd, Headquarters and Supply Companies had been completely equipped and on the morning of October 16, 1917, left Quantico for League Island, Philadelphia, preparatory to embarking for France. Colonel Albertus W. Catlin and the Regimental staff, with the exception of Lieut. Colonel Harry Lee, left at this time also. Lieut. Colonel Lee being ill, Major Holcomb assumed command of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, which remained behind. Arriving at League Island late in the afternoon of October 16th, the Regimental Headquarters Detachment lost no time in getting aboard the transport U.S.S. DeKalb. All baggage and freight were placed on board that night and at 8 A.M. the next morning the DeKalb got under way for New York, which it reached on the morning of the 18th. The day was spent in the harbor and the convoy formed and set sail during the night for France. The voyage across the ocean was uneventful, drills were held each morning and afternoon and general quarters and abandon ship drill were held regularly. On the morning of November 1, 1917, the DeKalb reached San Nazaire and dropped anchor.

In the meanwhile the 2nd and 3rd Battalions in Quantico had reached the advanced stages of their training. The construction of the Quantico rifle range had begun and was completed toward the middle of October. This afforded ample opportunity for practice firing over the regulation distances, not only with rifles but with the Lewis gun also. Companies and platoons learned the modern combat formations as specified in confidential pamphlets issued by the War Department, and in the British and French manuals. Drills were held in these formations and instructions given in their tactical uses. Companies and platoons attacked the model trench system, which had been finally completed, in the new wave formation, while small detachments were instructed in the art of mopping-up the trenches after the attacking wave had passed over. On one occasion the 3rd Battalion attacked the trenches, using live ammunition. The attack order was issued and zero hour specified; the attacking waves went over the top with others in close support. The crack of the rifles and the sputter of machine guns afforded an idea, somewhat vague, of the conditions of battle which were to be met in France. Vague, because there was no friendly artillery to help nor hostile artillery to hinder the advance upon the assigned objective.

On the morning of October 24th, 1917, the 3rd Battalion, having received orders the day before, entrained for League Island, Philadelphia. As the two long trains bearing this the 3rd contingent of the 6th Regiment to say good-bye to its birth place, Quantico, Virginia, pulled out of the station, the entire 2nd Battalion in line along the platform of the depot warehouse presented arms and the post band played the Star Spangled Banner. The battalion reached the Navy Yard, League Island, at six o'clock P.M. and boarded the U.S.S. Von Steuben which was anchored out in the Delaware River. Officers and men awoke on the morning of the 25th to find the ship steaming down the river. On the following morning the Von Steuben dropped anchor in New York harbor and remained there for five days. Absolute secrecy was maintained as to the time set for departure and destination. No one could go ashore. The remaining ships of the convoy, three transports, one armoured cruiser, the North Carolina, and two destroyers gathered, and on the night of October 31, 1917, the convoy began its journey to France. All went well until the evening of November 9th, when due to a misunderstanding of orders the Agamemnon and the Von Steuben collided in mid-ocean. A large hole was torn in the bow of the Von Steuben. This occurred in the edge of the submarine zone and the ships of the convoy were ordered to separate and meet the following day. At noon November 10th the Von Steuben took her place in line, temporarily repaired, and was able to make a speed of fifteen knots. Later in the day ten destroyers from the American fleet in European waters joined the convoy and the North Carolina turned back for the United States. The journey through the submarine zone was without further incident. Early on November 12th the hills of Bretony were sighted and at noon the convoy anchored in the Harbor at Brest, France.

The 2nd Battalion remained in Quantico. The weather grew colder and more severe, but training progressed. French, British and Italian officers came to Quantico to lecture upon the various phases of modern warfare and schools were held in the basic principles of warfare in general and modern trench warfare in particular. As the days passed rumors for departure for France became more frequent and yet there was no move. The battalion as a result of its continuous training became very proficient in drill, maneuvers and general combat. A generous proportion of furloughs both for men and officers was granted for Christmas and eagerly accepted. But it was not until January 19, 1918, that the battalion, with Lieut. Colonel Lee, finally left Quantico for League Island. The transport Henderson was waiting there and on the following day, January 20th, sailed for New York Harbor. The Henderson lay anchored off Staten Island for five days. On the night of the 24th of January the convoy got under way. The voyage was uneventful in a military sense. No submarines were sighted and nothing eventful occurred. Nevertheless the formidable convoy, the submarine watches and the numerous precautionary measures kept the atmosphere charged with suppressed excitement, especially in the submarine zone. The convoy bore well to the south and deviated considerably from the usual trans-Atlantic routes. On February 5th the Henderson arrived at the Port of San Nazaire. Adequate facilities for transportation were not immediately available and the battalion remained aboard the Henderson until February 8th. The entire Sixth Regiment was now in France.

In the meantime the 1st Battalion, which had arrived at San Nazaire on October 5, 1917, was stationed just outside of the town in a large camp composed of French wooden barracks, which were not in the best condition. Immediately after its arrival the 1st Battalion was assigned to guard duty at the camp and on the docks, and those who were not included in these details spent their time unloading ships as they arrived in port. A large working party of about two hundred men a day was furnished by the battalion for work on a large dam near the camp, which was being constructed under the supervision of the 17th Engineers, who were also stationed in the same camp. On October 15th Major Hughes and twelve other officers left San Nazaire for Gondrecourt, where the 1st Corps School was held. Captain Robert E. Adams, who shortly afterwards received his commission as Major, was in command of the 1st Battalion while Major

Hughes was at Gondrecourt. On November 7, 1917, the commanding officer, upon the order of the local military authorities, sent the 95th Company to do guard duty at Brest and La Havre, two platoons going to each of these places. This company was reassembled at Brest on December 13th, on which date it took over the Pontanezen barracks from the French. This battalion also sent one platoon, on December 17th, from the 76th Company and thirty men from the 74th Company to San Nazaire for duty as military police and dock guards at Nantes. The rest of the 1st Battalion remained at San Nazaire until January 6, 1918, when the 74th, 75th and 76th Companies entrained at San Nazaire for Damblain, Vosges, which was in the area designated for the training of the Marine Brigade. The 95th Company joined the battalion in this training area on January 28th, 1918.

When the Regiment Headquarters, Headquarters, Supply and 73rd Machine Gun Companies arrived at San Nazaire on November 1st, 1917, they found the 1st Battalion rounding out its first month in France and busily engaged in routine and somewhat arduous labor. Those Headquarters units remained at San Nazaire less than two weeks, November 14th finding them established at Bordeaux, six days ahead of the 3rd Battalion. Here, after the arrival of the 3rd Battalion, began a routine of labor and guard duty. The labor was performed in conjunction with the 18th Engineers and consisted mainly of constructing docks at Bassena. The following detachment and officer were detailed for provost and engineer duty in the neighboring camps and towns: The 1st platoon of the 97th Company, provost duty, November 27th to January 21st, at Tours; Captain Robert W. Voeth, provost marshall, November 27th to January 21st, at Tours; the 84th Company and one platoon of Headquarters Company, provost and fatigue duty at La Courneau, the 84th Company, under command of Major H.G. Bartlett, from December 18th to January 5th, and the platoon of Headquarters Company, under command of William A. Eddy, 2nd Lieut., from November 20th to December 18th; Lieut. Marshall with twenty men from the 97th Company from December 8th to January 5th, fatigue and provost duty at La Courtine; Lieut. Timmerman and thirty men from the 83rd Company, December 6th to January 4th, fatigue duty at La Marcheprine; Lieut. Roberts and the 1st platoon of the 83rd Company to Conon for provost duty, December 27th to January 6th. The Headquarters units and the 3rd Battalion were relieved by the 162nd Regiment National Guard on January 8th, 1918, and entrained on January 9th, 1918, at Carbon Blanc for the training area. After a three-day trip in 3rd class and box cars the troops were detrained at Damblain, Vosges, on January 12th, 1918. Regimental Headquarters was established at Blevaincourt, Vosges.

The 2nd Battalion, which arrived at San Nazaire, France, February 5, 1918, remained aboard the transport Henderson until February 8th, on which date the troops disembarked. They immediately entrained for Damblain, Vosges, and arrived there on February 10th.

Thus the units were again assembled and the Sixth Regiment was intact with the battalions stationed in the vicinity of Blevaincourt. In the meantime the Regiment had been assigned to the Fourth Brigade of the Second Division. The Division was commanded by Major General Bundy and the brigade by Brigadier General Doyen. Intensive training for trench warfare commenced at once. This training was very severe, due both to the strenuous schedule and the winter season which set in about this time. However, grilling as it seemed then, it so hardened the men that they were able to bear up under the strain of continuous fighting which later became their lot. The schedule included hikes, close order drill, extended order, bayonet fighting, games, practice in both rifle and hand grenade throwing, rifle range practice, storming trench systems, taking strong points, defense against gas attacks and all modes of signalling then in use. Up to that time the uniform had been campaign hats, but now came the equipment that men at the front were never without: helmets and gas masks. The men were required to become proficient in doing everything both with and without gas masks.

About the 1st of March it was rumored that the Regiment was going into the line for a period of training. Equipment began to come in, such as trench knives, trench boots and extra clothing. To further substantiate this rumor, practice billeting parties were sent out, which indicated that traveling would soon begin. On March 12th, 1918, the sea bags were packed and stored, the men keeping only such extra clothing as they could carry in their packs.

The regiment moved by rail to the Toulon sector, the movement beginning March 14, 1918, and on March 16, 1918, the Regimental Headquarters was established at Camp Boues. The 3rd Battalion was the first unit of the regiment to begin this move. This battalion marched to Breuvanne and entrained. It arrived at Dugny, ten kilometers from Verdun at noon March 15th, detrained and moved by companies. Orders were to clear the loading platform within two hours to avoid shelling. After marching approximately sixteen kilometers to the support position of the Toulon Sector companies of the 3rd Battalion were billeted in the following camps: 82nd Company, Camp Ronde Fontaine and Camp Richert; 83rd Company, Camp Marquenterre; 84th Company, Camp Massa; 97th Company, Camp Fontaine St. Robert. The 73rd Machine Gun Company was billeted at Camp Massa.

The 2nd Battalion began the move on March 17th by hiking to Bourmont, from which place it entrained for Souilly, France, where it detrained March 18th and hiked to Camp Massa.

The 1st Battalion left the training area on March 17th by train, detrained at Lommes on March 18th and marched eighteen kilometers to Sommedieue, where it was stationed in reserve behind a part of the French 10th Army Corps.

The 3rd Battalion went into line in the Mont-sous-lea-Cotes subsector, Bonchamp, on the evening of March 18th with the 82nd, 83rd, and 84th Companies in line and the 97th Company in reserve at Camp Fontaine St. Robert.

This sector was located about one kilometer north of Les Eparges, and was considered at that time to be a very quiet sector. The lines were far apart and there was little or no infantry action of importance. The enemy artillery, however, showed a marked increase in its activity and endeavored to impress this regiment upon its first duty in the front lines. It gave the regiment a daily shower of shell fire, which proved to be rather ineffective. On April 6th the enemy attempted a raid on the 74th Company, which was posted in the town of Tresevaux, but did not meet with success. He was repulsed, leaving four dead behind, and the 74th Company lost one dead and three wounded. On April 12th the regiment received its first heavy loss when the 74th Company, which was then in reserve at Camp Fontaine St. Robert, was heavily shelled, the majority being gas shells. The enemy fire was extremely accurate, catching the men in their billets before they had a chance to escape. All officers were evacuated in a serious condition and about two hundred and twenty men were also effected by the gas, forty of them dying later as the result of this first bombardment. On April 25th Major Adams was assigned to detached duty and Major M. E. Shearer assumed command of the 1st Battalion.

The 2nd Battalion remained in reserve at Camp Massa until March 28th, furnishing trench digging details. On the night of March 28th the 2nd Battalion took up a front line position, relieving the 3rd Battalion. This position embraced the ruined and shattered towns of Mesnil, Bonzee and Mont-sous-les-Cote. On the night of April 20th-21st, after the enemy had put down a box barrage around the outpost town of Villers, The Hindenburg Circus attacked P.P.-16 and P.P. 15 with flame throwers and grenades. This raid was repulsed by the 84th Company with rifle fire and grenades, the enemy leaving two dead in the wire. With the exception of the incidents mentioned the only activities of any kind were patrols almost every night and the usual light artillery shelling in the day time. The men grew accustomed to dugout life and the various phases of trench warfare. Enemy airplanes were active and the men received valuable training in keeping under

cover. On the night of April 22nd, after a four-days rest in reserve billets at Camp Sommedieu, the 1st Battalion relieved the French at Haudiomont in the front line, about two kilometers north of the line which this battalion had formerly held. The Headquarters of the regiment was moved to Camp Romaine, relieving the 252nd Regiment Inf., French, Verdun Sector, April 23rd. On the night of April 24th the 3rd Battalion was relieved by the 3rd Battalion, 20th French Regiment, and went into reserve at Camp Chiffoure. The 2nd Division, which had been relieved from the front line April 7th, relieved the French on May 1st in the trenches, its front line embracing the ruined towns of Watronville, Tresaveaux, and Rondveaux. On May 2nd the 3rd Battalion relieved the 1st, disposing of its companies as follows: Two companies in line, one in support and one in reserve at Chiffoure. The stay in this subsector was uneventful. On May 13th the Regimental Headquarters was moved to Haudianville. However, the first movement which was to take the regiment entirely out of this sector was begun on May 10th; on that date the 1st Battalion embarked in French camions and arrived that night at Outrepont. The 2nd Battalion entrained at Ancomont for Blesme, where it arrived that day, detrained and proceeded by march to Changy near Bar-le-Duc, at which point they arrived May 14th. On May 13th the Regimental Headquarters began its movement and the 3rd Battalion was relieved on the night of the 13th by the 174th French. The Regimental Headquarters and the 3rd Battalion arrived in the new area May 15th and Regimental Headquarters was established at Doucy, near Vitry-le-Francois. A training schedule was put into effect. While in this area a number of officers and noncommissioned officers were sent to the various Army training schools.

On May 19th the regiment marched to Vitry-le-Francois, where it entrained for a new sector. It was thought at the time that a short training period would ensue, after which the Second Division would relieve the First Division at Montidier. The regiment detrained at Parmion Isle Adam on May 20th. On May 21st the Regimental Headquarters was established at Serans, near Paris. These marches were very long and on account of the extreme heat taxed the endurance of the men to the utmost. From May 21st to May 31st the regiment remained in the vicinity of Serans and the troops were further instructed in French combat drills. The rainy season had ended and climatic conditions were ideal.

Plans for relieving the First Division were cancelled May 30th and orders were issued for this regiment to make a quick move. The German attack on the Chemin-de-Dames had been successful and the Second Division was ordered to proceed by trucks to the Chateau Thierry area in order to support the French who were being driven back. The following memorandum was sent to all units of the regiment:

"Advance information official received that this Regiment will move at 10:00 P.M. 30 May by buss to new area. All trains shall be loaded at once and arrangements hastened. Orders will follow. Wagons when loaded will move to Serans to form train.

By order of Colonel Catlin:

F.E. Evans,
Major, USMC,
Adjutant."

The regiment assembled at Serans and waited until about day-break, when the camions arrived. Embussing was completed before 9:30 that morning, and the now famous ride, as the result of which the regiment was thrown into the breach which threatened the French capital, was begun. The military situation was extremely critical. The German objective was Paris. The armies of the Crown Prince were driving furiously between Soissons and Rheims. A vicious salient had been established by the thrust for Paris. This regiment was to be placed at the apex of this salient, and before it was one of the great crises of history. The troops spent that day and night in camions and reached Montreuil-aux-Lions early on the morning of June

1st. They were given a short rest in houses sheltered from aerial observation. At 2:30 P.M. the regiment moved forward again along the Chateau Thierry-La Ferte road. The French were falling back. The 1st Battalion, Major Shearer commanding, took a position north-east of Lucy-le-Bocage, and the 2nd Battalion, Major Holcomb commanding, went into position along a line extending from Triangle Farm on the right to Lucy-le-Bocage on the left. The 3rd Battalion, Major Sibley commanding, took a reserve position northeast of La Voie du Chatel.

On June 2nd Regimental Headquarters was established at La Voie du Chatel, and the 3rd Battalion was better placed to maintain liaison, which was difficult; with the French falling back the front line was constantly shifting and was irregular. The enemy had not as yet been able to bring up the bulk of his artillery owing to his rapid advance. There was considerable confusion of orders, many of them verbal, as to what French units were to be relieved. The result of this was that gaps in the line developed constantly. It was only by the almost superhuman efforts of the Intelligence officers and regimental and battalion commanders that liaison was maintained. The war of position had suddenly become a thing of the past. The war of movement, similar in some respects to the tropical fighting with which old Marine officers and men were familiar, had developed. Enemy artillery fire increased and there were some losses. All companies of the 1st Battalion were in line: Captain Burns commanding the 74th Company; Captain Fuller the 75th; Captain Stowell the 76th; and Captain Caldwell the 95th. The 2nd Battalion had three companies in line and one in reserve. The 96th Company, Captain Duncan commanding, was the right unit with its right resting on the Paris-Metz road at Le Thiolet. The 79th Company, Captain Zane commanding, was the center of the battalion front and occupied the Triangle Farm. The 78th Company, Captain Messersmith commanding, joined forces with the 79th at the gully just northwest of Triangle Farm on the right and with the 1st Battalion at Lucy-le-Bocage on the left. The 80th Company, Captain Coffenburg commanding, was held in reserve. French infantry was in front of the 2nd Battalion on the night of June 1st-2nd, which passed quietly.

Late on the afternoon of June 2nd information was received that a German fresh division was expected to attack the American right with two regiments north of the Paris road and with one regiment south of the road. As result of this information the 97th Company of the 3rd Battalion was ordered to report to Major Holcomb, of the 2nd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion had spent the night of June 2nd in the open field east of the woods and north of La Voie du Chatel on the Lucy-le-Bocage road in order to escape the barrage which it was thought the enemy would put down on the Voie du Chatel at night-fall. At break of day the 3rd Battalion took up its former position. Heavy shelling during the day resulted in several casualties among the 3rd Battalion scouts and the 84th Company. About noon the 82nd Company of the 3rd Battalion was sent to reinforce the front line northeast of Champillon. This company had several casualties while taking up the position. At dark the 83rd Company and one platoon of the 73rd Machine Gun Company moved up and joined the 82nd Company south of Torcy, Major Sibley taking command of a portion of the line extending for about one thousand yards in an easterly direction. This line was in most places along the edge of the woods, at some points the enemy being in the same woods only fifty yards distant. Enemy artillery and machine guns were active during the afternoon and night. The French continued to fall back through the lines of this regiment. The enemy could be seen filtering through the woods northeast of the Bouresches-Vaux railroad. He seemed to sense the presence of formidable troops opposite him, for his attempts to advance were not spirited. He was stopoed with machine gun and rifle fire, and American artillery, of which there was now aplenty, did effective work. Several rounds, however, fell short into the 79th Company's position, causing five casualties.

On June 3rd the enemy brought up more artillery and registered

on the different positions of this regiment, which was by this time fairly well intrenched. On the morning of June 4th it was found that the French had left a portion of the line to the right of that commanded by Major Sibley unoccupied. A portion of the 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment and some machine guns were sent to fill the gap. The enemy artillery, machine guns and snipers were active during the entire day, but the casualties of this regiment were not heavy. The 84th Company, which had been left in La Voie du Chatel, suffered some casualties from artillery fire. La Conse Farm was shelled with 150's on the afternoon of June 4th and the 80th Company, in reserve for the 2nd Battalion, suffered some casualties. The Battalion Headquarters and the reserve company were therefore moved to Bois de Clerembauts, about two hundred yards to the rear of La Conse Farm, where there was little shelling and no more casualties.

On June 5th conditions continued much the same as on the previous day. The day was spent in digging and strengthening the positions. During the early morning hours the enemy launched an attack, but was repulsed without serious loss to this regiment. After daylight and during the day the enemy was seen from time to time and the snipers of this regiment did effective work. American artillery also was effective. About 9 P.M. on June 5th the following order was sent to Major Sibley, 3rd Battalion:

"Your battalion will be relieved sometime tonight by Turrills battalion, when 82nd and 83rd Companies are relieved you will proceed via Champillon via present regimental headquarters to Ferme Blanche, where your battalion will go into reserve. Orders will be given to the C.O. 84th Company and C.O. 97th Company to report to you at Ferme Blanche. The platoon 73rd Company will remain in place. Guide will be found at Regimental Headquarters, Colonel's office, to conduct you to Ferme Blanche.

By order
F.E.E."

The 2nd Battalion was relieved by a battalion of the 23rd Infantry at about 3 A.M. June 6th and proceeded to the woods near Maison Blanche and south of Lucy-le-Bocage. Enemy artillery was very active against Lucy-le-Bocage. At this place the 2nd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion, which went into reserve. That day up to 3 P.M. was comparatively quiet. Major J. A. Hughes assumed command of the 1st Battalion, relieving Major Shearer.

The following order governed that part of the attack in which this regiment participated against the Chateau Thierry salient - the offensive which brought honor and commendation to every unit of the American Expeditionary Forces which participated:

"Headquarters, 4th Brigade, Marine Corps,
Am.E.F., 6 June 1918; 2:05 P.M.

FIELD ORDER
No. 2.

MAP: MEAUX 49
1:50,000.

1. The enemy holds the general line BOURESCHES-TORCY-MONTECOURT.
2. This Brigade attacks on the general line BOURESCHES-TORCY.
3. The attack will be in two phases:
To take the Bois de BELLEAU.
To take R.R. Station BOURESCHES:
BOURESCHES Village; brook crossing (173.9-264.1);
Hill 126; Hill 135.

(a) Disposition of troops for the first phase. The BOIS de BELLEAU will be taken by the 3rd Bn. 5th Marines (less 1 Co.) on the left and the 3rd Bn. 6th Marines on the right. The attack, first phase, will be commanded by Colonel Catlin, 6th Marines.

(b) Sector limits, 1st phase, left battalion:

Northern: 262.8
Southern: 261.2

Right Battalion:

Northern: 261.2
Southern: 260.8

(c) The 2nd Bn. 6th Marines will advance its left to conform to the progress made by the battalion on its left.

(d) Disposition of troops for the second phase. The position R.R. station BOURESCHES; BOURESCHES VILLAGE, Brook Crossing (173.9-264.1); Hill 126; Hill 133, will be taken by the 3rd Bn., 6th Marines, on the right, the 3rd Bn. 5th Marines (less 1 Co.) in the center, and the 1st Bn. 5th and 1 Co. each of the 2nd Bn. and 3rd Bn. 5th Marines.

(e) Sector limits, 2nd phase:

3rd Bn. 6th Marines.

Northern: Hill 181; R.R. Bridge,
(177.0-261.3)

Southern: Hill 138 - southern end of
BOURESCHES Village.

3rd Battn. 5th Marines (less 1 co)

Northern: Hill 133 to BOURESCHES-
TORCY road at intersection
with Y line 176.

Southern: Hill 181; R.R. Bridge,
(177.0-261.3) exclusive.

1st Bn. 5th Marines and 1 Co. each of 2nd and 3rd Bns.
5th Marines:

Northern: Square wood to brook crossing (173.9-264.1)
and Hill 126.

Southern: From right at present position to Hill 133,
exclusive.

(f) The attack of the center and right of the second phase will be commanded by Colonel Catlin, 6th Marines.

The attack of the left of the second phase will be commanded by Lieut. Col. Feland, 5th Marines.

(g) The attack on the BOIS DE BELLEAU and on the village and railroad station of BOURESCHES will be supported by the 77th (M.G.) Co. The attack on the brook crossing (173.9-269.1) 126-133, inclusive, will be supported by the machine guns with the 1st Bn. 5th Marines.

(x) The artillery preparation will be made in accordance with orders from the C.G., 2nd F.A. Brigade.

(y) The attack on BOIS DE BELLEAU will begin at 5 P.M. The second phase will begin as soon as the first phase has attained its objective.

(z) Aviation will be as ordered by the C.G., 21st Army Corps (French).

4. The 2nd Bn. 5th Marines (less 1 Co.) will constitute the Brigade Reserve in the woods northwest of LUCY-le-BOCAGE.
5. The position when attained will be at once organized to be held against counter-attack.
6. Trains will remain in place.
7. Brigade and Regimental P.C.'s remain in place.

J.G. Harbord,
Brigadier General, N.A."

This order was received on the afternoon of June 6th. There was no other information concerning the enemy or the terrain, and as there was no time for scouting the company commanders were shown the above order, their objectives on the map, and were conducted to the lines from which the regiment would start the attack. The companies of the 3rd Battalion were placed as follows: 82nd and 84th Companies on line, the 82nd being on the left of the ravine that runs from Lucy-le-Bocage to Bouresches, and the 84th being on the right of this ravine; the 83rd company was placed in support of the 82nd and the 97th Company in support of the 84th Company; all companies being in four-wave formation. The 2nd Battalion placed its companies as follows: The 96th Company in line, the 78th, 79th and 80th Companies supporting the 3rd Battalion. The 1st Battalion was in reserve.

The attack against Belleau Woods and the village of Bouresches started at 5 P.M. At 5:30 P.M. the 3rd Battalion advanced. The advance in the woods continued until 8:30 P.M., when the enemy machine gun fire became so heavy that further advance was impracticable. Many prisoners were taken and captured machine guns turned against the enemy. Minnenwerfers and a great quantity of ammunition were left behind by the enemy. The losses in killed and wounded of this regiment were large. The edge of Belleau Woods near Bouresches was attained. This was the first objective. The two right companies of the 3rd Battalion advanced for a large part through open wheat fields and were under constant observation and direct artillery and machine gun fire. The two left companies of this battalion were entirely in the southern sector of Bois Belleau. They did not meet serious resistance, however, until they came to the many machine gun nests which were located in the high rocky crags in the southeastern portion of the Woods. The second phase of the attack, namely the capture of BOURESCHES, was not to begin until the Bois Belleau had been freed from the enemy, consequently it was impracticable for the right companies to advance beyond the companies on the left. The attack by the 2nd Battalion was made across six hundred yards of open ground under intense artillery and machine gun fire and the conduct of officers and men alike was excellent. Captain Duncan of the 96th Company was killed by a shell just as his company started forward. 1st Lieut. Robertson assumed command of the Company, and with twenty-four men, the remainder of one platoon of his company, took the town of Bouresches after a hard struggle. The spirit of the men, including those wounded, was deserving of special mention. Shortly after the attack began Colonel Catlin was seriously wounded by a machine gun bullet and Lieut. Colonel Harry Lee assumed command of the regiment, establishing his P.C. at Lucy-le-Bocage. Liaison was maintained by runners and telephone.

At 8:45 P.M. Major Sibley, commanding the 3rd Battalion, sent the following message to Regimental Headquarters:

"Date: 6-6-18 Hq. 8:45 p.m.

To: Regimental Commander.

Unable to advance infantry further because of strong

this road north-

machine gun positions and artillery fire. Have given orders to hold present position at far edge of woods. Losses already heavy. Await instructions. Sibley."

In reply to this message word was received to dig in and hold ground gained. Major Holcomb, commanding the 2nd Battalion, asked for reinforcements to aid in holding Bouresches, the detachment of twenty-four men, under 1st Lieut. Robertson and Lieut. Cates, being insufficient. In the emergency, Major Sibley, without instructions, ordered to 84th and 97th Companies to advance from their position in the field into the town of Bouresches. They made the reinforcement at 11:30 P.M. without meeting resistance. The 2nd Battalion Headquarters was established about eight hundred yards southwest of Bouresches and those of the 3rd Battalion remained in the ravine near the 82nd and 83rd Companies; all companies being ordered to dig in.

During the night 6th-7th June companies from the Second Engineers arrived and were assigned to position in the rear of the two battalions holding the front line. There was great difficulty with communications during this time. The telephone lines were frequently shot out and runners encountered gas in some areas. Water was available only by being carried in canteens along difficult routes. Some rations were dumped, but owing to scarcity of men only a few could be carried to the troops. The men occupying Bouresches were able to get some rations by Ford truck during the night. Ammunition, consisting of Chauchat, Springfield, pistol, flares and very few grenades were brought up. The Engineers also brought up tools. During the night of 6th-7th the Bois de Belleau was under lively artillery fire most of the time. The gas from high explosive shells was very annoying. Early in the day of 7th June a reconnaissance was made of the front line positions and battalion commanders made readjustments of certain of the units so as to afford better protection against the enemy who held strong positions in the woods just to the northeast. The 80th Company, under Captain Coffenburg, which had a position astride the Lucy-Bouresches road was ordered into a support position in the southwestern corner of the Bois de Belleau. No sleep had been possible the previous night and the men had had no hot food for eight days. The enemy also held dangerous and harassing positions well on the left flank. The day, June 7th, passed rather quietly, except in the afternoon when a lively artillery bombardment of the woods was made by the enemy. At 11:30 P.M. the enemy attacked the positions held by this regiment and put down heavy artillery and machine gun fire. The losses of this regiment were comparatively slight, mostly from artillery fire. The enemy, however, it was afterwards learned from prisoners and from observation of dead bodies, suffered heavy losses. Companies of the regiment on the eastern edge of the wood did very effective work with automatic rifles and captured enemy machine guns against a large body of Germans who attacked Bouresches from the north. The assaults of the enemy broke down before they reached the lines held by this regiment.

Plans were made for an attack on the morning of June 8th by the 3rd Battalion. The companies were in position by 6 A.M. of that date. The 82nd Company was on the right with its right resting on the southeast corner of the Woods. The 83rd Company was on the left of the 82nd Company. Both of these companies were in four waves. Two platoons of the 80th Company were in support and instructed to protect the left flank. A detail of the 2nd Engineers was ordered to protect the right flank and to advance in rear of the right of the 82nd Company along the eastern edge of the woods, other Engineers and two platoons of the 80th Company being held in reserve. The 83rd Company was withdrawn into the Woods from its advanced position in time to get in line. The attack was preceded by a short bombardment by Stokes mortars belonging to the Stokes mortar platoon of the Headquarters Company, having been brought up and placed in position during the night. This bombardment did not

prove to be very effective on account of the density of the forest and the consequent difficulty in observing the fire. The attack began as scheduled. The machine gun nests were soon encountered and it was found that they were well fortified in the rocks and held an exceedingly strong position. The fire from these machine guns was terrific. The enemy was also well supplied with hand grenades. This fire cost the regiment heavy casualties, but it captured four enemy machine guns and killed many of the enemy who were garrisoned in these nests. Much damage was done to the enemy by automatic rifles. Bombs were scarce. Rifles played the most important role and many of the enemy were also killed by the bayonet. Hand-to-hand fighting continued until about 8:30 A.M. when it was found that the enemy had many machine guns placed in a series of strong points, or forts, in such a manner that one flanked the other. Some of these strong points were located and a few of them surrounded and captured. It was decided that it would be impossible to carry these forts without artillery preparation even by expending large forces. Plans were made to hold the ground gained by withdrawing the troops sufficiently to gain cover and dig in. This was accomplished by 11:30 A.M. During the afternoon of the 8th the regiment was heavily shelled by enemy artillery, which caused some casualties. Word was received from Brigade Headquarters that the enemy machine gun nests that had not been captured would be subjected to artillery fire and that the line of this regiment in that vicinity should be withdrawn slightly in order to avoid endangering the men. The following message was sent by the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion:

"Will have men under cover for artillery fire south edge of woods within one hundred and twenty-five yards of edge by 3 P.M. Regret to report officers and men are too much exhausted for further attack or strong resistance until after several hours' rest. Enemy shelling our position now. Damage not serious at present. Sibley." Ammunition was received during the day. Cold rations were carried to the men. It was then decided to relieve the 3rd Battalion with the 1st Battalion. These plans were changed, however, and it was finally decided to vacate the positions near the Woods entirely, in order to give the artillery a free hand in reducing the enemy strong holds. The 3rd Battalion, therefore, rendezvoused at daylight on the morning of the 9th in the Bois de Platiere, about two kilometers south of Marigny, and went into Corps reserve. Here the men of this battalion received the first hot food they had had since May 31st. Regimental Headquarters was moved from La Boie du Chatel to Maison Blanche on June 8th. The 2nd Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, on night 9th-10th, and went into reserve in the woods east of Maison Blanche.

On the night of June 9th the 1st Battalion moved up to assist in the attack on positions south of Bois de Belleau. Early on the morning of June 10th the attack was launched from the south with two companies in the front line and two in support. The objective was only partially gained, owing to the heavy machine gun fire of the enemy. It was renewed on June 11th and resulted in cleaning out the southern half of the woods, reaching the objective. Losses in this engagement were heavy. Captain Burns of the 74th Company and Captain Fuller of the 75th were among those killed. On the night June 11th-12th the 2nd Battalion moved to La Sableonniere Woods, where they were held as Corps reserve. This same night the 3rd Battalion moved up into the woods N.W. of Lucy-le-Bocage, and the next afternoon at dusk they relieved a battalion of the 5th Regiment in the positions northeast of Hill 142.

About this time the regiment received replacements. Although they had never before been under fire, these replacements did excellent work in the fighting that followed.

At 1:30 on the morning of June 13th the 2nd Battalion was ordered to take up a position in the woods northwest of Lucy-le-Bocage as Brigade reserve. A statement of a dying German officer was to the effect that the enemy had brought up a fresh division and intended

to attack at dawn. The battalion had just reached the woods northwest of Lucy-le-Bocage when a message was received that the enemy had taken Bouresches and that Major Holcomb would take two companies of his battalion and move to the woods southeast of Lucy-le-Bocage with a view to counterattacking. The 78th and 96th Companies were sent on this mission and covered the dangerous two kilometers of open country to this position in open formation and without interference by the enemy artillery. The destination was reached about 8:00 A.M., when the companies dug in. Later developments proved that Bouresches remained in our hands, so the 78th and 96th Companies spent the day in the woods. Early the next morning the enemy shelled these woods with gas and high explosive shells, causing heavy casualties to the two companies. At 2:00 A.M. this same morning (June 14th) the 2nd Battalion was ordered to relieve the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Regiment in the Bois de Belleau. This relief was accomplished, but by next afternoon practically all of the 78th and 96th Companies had been evacuated either as wound or gas casualties. The positions in the Bois de Belleau of which the enemy still held a part was a very active sector. The line consisted almost entirely of dangerous salients and enemy machine gun nests. The German artillery and minnenwerfers harassed our positions almost continuously. On the night 15th-16th the 1st Battalion of the 174th French Infantry relieved the 3rd, which went to the Bois de Platiere where it was held in division reserve. On the night of June 16th-17th the 2nd Battalion was relieved by a battalion of the 7th Infantry, American. Before the relief was made the enemy made two attacks on our positions, but we repulsed them and inflicted heavy casualties. Upon completion of the relief the battalion went into Corps reserve at the Bois de Gros Jean.

On the night 18th-19th a battalion of the 7th Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion, which moved to Manteuil-sur-Marne. On the 19th Regimental Headquarters was established at Montreuil. The entire regiment was out of the front line, for the first time since May 31st. The men were given a much-needed rest, baths and hot food. The Y.M.C.A. and Red Cross issued chocolate and cakes, which helped materially to improve the morale of the men.

On the night of the 21st the 3rd Battalion went into Brigade reserve in the woods northwest of Lucy-le-Bocage and the following night relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Infantry in the southwest corner of the Bois de Belleau. On the night of the 22nd-23rd the 2nd Battalion moved up into the woods northwest of Lucy as Brigade reserve. Regimental Headquarters was moved to Maison Blanche on June 23rd. The following night the 1st Battalion moved from Manteuil up into the woods northwest of Lucy-le-Bocage, where it was held as Brigade reserve.

Every night ambush patrols were sent out and working parties put up wire in front of the sector, for the enemy was expected to make a general attack at almost any moment. On June 24th Major Shearer's battalion of the 5th Regiment attacked and succeeded in driving the enemy from his positions in the northeastern part of the Bois de Belleau. On June 28th Regimental Headquarters moved to La Boie du Chatel. That night the 1st Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion in the southeast corner of the Bois de Belleau.

On July 2nd three hundred men and about twenty officers were sent to Paris to take part in the Fourth of July parade.

On the nights of July 5th and 6th the 103rd Infantry relieved this regiment, which immediately took up positions on the Army reserve line near Bezu-le-Cuery with two battalions in the line and the other at Manteuil in reserve. Regimental Headquarters was established at Pissoloupc. The battalions were each given a three or four days' stay in the reserve position at Manteuil, where the men had daily swims in the Marne. On July 16th Major Hughes returned to the Regiment, assuming command of the 1st Battalion.

During the stay in the Chateau Thierry salient this Brigade stopped the enemy's advance on their front, drove them back from 1-1/2 to 2 kilometers on a four-kilometer front, captured approximately fifteen hundred prisoners and repulsed four counterattacks. The casualties of this regiment were approximately two hundred and ninety-five officers and men killed and fourteen hundred wounded.

On the night of July 16th the regiment embussed at Manteuil for an unknown destination. The men thought they were going back to some quiet rest area, but they were sadly mistaken, for after riding all night and until noon of the next day the troops debussed at Brassoire in the Soissons sector. From here they hiked to positions in the Villers-Cotterets forest. This was one of quickly-executed moves, planned by Marshall Foch, which proved to be wholly unexpected by the enemy. The troops were massed in the forest under cover from enemy observation. This regiment, after marching for twenty kilometers in a heavy rain storm, over crowded roads, finally went into bivouac in the Bois de Retz. Violent artillery action in the surrounding forest at dawn of July 18th gave notice that the attack had begun. This regiment was divisional reserve and followed about three kilometers in rear of the attacking troops. The great number of prisoners we passed on their way to the rear showed that the initial attack had been a complete success. The regiment bivouaced for the night some two kilometers behind the new line at Beau Repaire Farm. Officers and men were in high spirits at the brilliant success of the drive and were eager to take their part in the advance. Enemy airplanes flew low and attempted to harass this regiment and other troops massed in the woods behind the lines, with machine gun fire. Battalion commanders were called to Regimental Headquarters and told that the regiment would attack the German line east of Vierzy on the morning of July 19th. This information was given to the battalion commanders at about 4:30 A.M. of July 19th. The attack was started at 8:30 A.M. with the 1st Battalion on the right of the Regimental area, the 2nd on the left and the third in support. The attack was supported by tanks. The advance to the front line, a little more than a kilometer distant, was across perfectly open wheat fields. The pace, because of the necessity of following the tanks, was slow and the advance over the entire distance was through a heavy barrage put down by the enemy. When the frontlines were passed the enemy machine guns proved most troublesome. A halt was made after a gain of about one kilometer for the reason that the casualties had so reduced the regiment that further advance was practically impossible. What remained of the regiment took shelter in a line of semi-complete intrenchments constructed by the Germans, where from 10:30 A.M. until dark the regiment was subjected to the enemy's artillery, one-pounder and machine gun fire. Early in the fighting it was discovered that an uncovered gap had developed between the 1st and 2nd Battalions, and Major Sibley, commanding the 3rd Battalion, to which had been attached the 15th and 77th Machine Gun Companies, one platoon each from the 73rd and 81st Machine Gun Companies, also the Stokes mortar and one-pounder platoons of the Headquarters Company without their mortars and one-pounders, was ordered to fill this gap. He ordered the 83rd and 84th Companies to advance into this portion of the line which was uncovered, the remainder of Major Sibley's command following the leading battalions at a distance of one thousand yards. The 77th Company and the platoon of 81st Company were detached from the 3rd Battalion later in the day. The following message was sent to all battalion commanders at 3:45 P.M.:

"From: C.O. 6th Regt.

At: P.C.

19 July 1918 - 3:45 P.M. No. 10 By runner.

To: C.O.'s 1st, 2nd, 3rd Bns., Hqrs.Co., 1st Bn. 2nd Engrs.

The Division Commander directs us to dig in and hold our present line at all costs. No further advance will be made for the present. He congratulates the command on its gallant conduct in the face of severe casualties.

Let me have sketch of your position and disposition. Ammunition at crossroads 112 southeast of Vierzy.

Lee."

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Conditions were bad throughout the regiment. It was practically impossible to send out water details and canteens were empty. The men dug in as well as possible, but digging was dangerous and the enemy fire increased the casualties rapidly. The 1st Battalion lost in killed Captain Kearns, 95th Company, Lieut. Burr of the battalion Headquarters, and Lieut. Redford, and in wounded Captain Turner, Battalion adjutant, and seven lieutenants. The 2nd Battalion losses were heavy. Only three company officers remained in that battalion when the regiment was relieved. Of the other officers Lieuts. John W. Overton and Charles W. Roy were killed while advancing at the head of their platoons. The 3rd Battalion lost 39% of its officers. The regiment had entered the battle with an approximate strength of twenty-eight hundred men, three hundred and fifty of these not being engaged. Of the twenty-four hundred and fifty men actually engaged there were thirteen hundred killed and wounded. The regiment was relieved about midnight of July 19th by Algerians and withdrew, remaining in reserve resting. While in bivouac near Translor Farm, July 20th, the regiment suffered several casualties from falling limbs of trees. The forest had been subjected to intense shell fire and branches and trunks of trees had been partly severed, and the breeze which sprang up caused many of them to fall. During the night the troops were also subjected to intermittent long range shelling from Austrian 130's. Coming after the strenuous fighting, the shelling, the downpour of rain and the falling branches added greatly to the mental and physical exhaustion of the troops. The Quartermaster's department issued some new clothes while the regiment was resting in the back area. On July 31st the regiment marched to Nanteuil-le-Haudonin, where it entrained for the Toul Sector.

The regiment detrained August 1st at Nancy and from August 2nd to August 6th Regimental Headquarters was at Chaligny. During this time the regiment was reorganized, cleaned up and rested. More clothing was issued, replacements joined and many casuals, men who had been evacuated to hospitals, returned. A number of enlisted men were commissioned and several of them sent to Army School at Langres. August 5th the regiment moved to Liverdun and on August 7th Regimental Headquarters was established at Dieulouard. The 2nd Battalion relieved the 340th French regiment in the trenches at Pont-a-Mousson, with the 1st and 3rd Battalions in reserve. The sector was a very quiet one. On the night of August 8th-9th the enemy put down a box barrage on the right of the position held by the 2nd Battalion and everything pointed to a raid by him, but he did not penetrate the lines. Only two men were slightly wounded. Effective work at reconnaissance was carried out and patrolling was successful, but the ambushes of this regiment met with no success. Apparently the enemy was content to rest within his own wire. There were no infantry developments. Both artilleries were quiet and each side moderately active in the air. While in this vicinity the men were given swimming instruction in the river and liberty to Nancy was granted to 25% of the reserve units. On August 16th Lieut. Colonel Holcomb was assigned to duty as second in command of the Regiment, Major Ernest C. Williams succeeding Lieut. Colonel Holcomb in command of the 2nd Battalion. The regiment was relieved on the 16th of August and on August 17th the Headquarters of the Regiment was moved to Harmonville. The 1st Battalion arrived and was billeted at Harmonville on August 18th. The 2nd Battalion was billeted at the Bois de l'Eveque, and the 3rd Battalion at Autreville. While in this area the new replacements were instructed in new features of warfare, hikes were held and more casuals, as well as replacements, both officers and men, were received. A rifle range and maneuver ground at Bois de l'Eveque was used in turn by the different battalions.

On September 22nd, after standing-by all the day before, orders were received to begin a series of marches which were to take the regiment into the St. Mihiel sector and into the first wholly American grand offensive. The First Army had just been brought into being and rumors of a big drive against the German strongholds in the salient in front of Metz had been rife for weeks. It was planned to march by night and to bivouac in the woods during the day,

screened from aerial observation. The marches were not extremely severe. Regimental Headquarters moved as follows: Thuilly September 2nd-3rd; Chandonney September 4th; Ferme de Sebastopol September 5th-10th. At Ferme de Sebastopol drill and attack formations through woods and underbrush were held. Replacements and casualties joined the regiment on September 6th, giving each company a strength of approximately two hundred and twenty men. On September 10th the regiment marched to Manonville, where Regimental Headquarters was established and troops bivouacked in the woods in that vicinity. Here on September 11th all battalion officers and company commanders received tank instructions. Emphasis was laid on maintaining liaison between tanks and infantry. It was clearly indicated that this was to be one of the great offensives of the war. Troops were massed in every woods. The amount of heavy artillery, especially of long range guns mounted on railway trucks and well camouflaged, exceeded that of any former offensive. On September 11th a number of replacements were received, bringing the regiment approximately to full complement. These replacements, like all former ones, consisted mostly of men who had enlisted in the Marine Corps after war had been declared and had received the regular recruit training at Parris Island, South Carolina, Mare Island, California, and other recruit depots in the United States. From the recruit depots these men were sent to Quantico, Virginia, where replacement battalions and regiments were formed. At Quantico they received instruction in the methods of modern warfare. After arriving in France they were held for various periods of time in the training areas, where many of them were sent to schools for instruction in the different specialties. A few noncommissioned officers with several years' experience who were taken from ship duty and other stations, were distributed among the replacements before they left America. As a whole the replacements were as well trained as could be expected, and quickly became imbued with the spirit of the regiment.

Preparations for engaging the enemy were made during the afternoon of September 11th. Blanket rolls were stored in the woods and men left to guard them. This detail was picked from the 20% reserve which had been left behind. Stokes mortar, one pounder and pioneer troops from the Headquarters Company were distributed among the battalions. Ammunition, including rifle, Chauchat and VB bombs, was obtained and distributed. The tentative plan of attack was given to the battalion commanders, who discussed them with their company commanders during the afternoon. The regiment was to move to the "jumping-off" place, near Limey, as early in the night as possible and was to be in position by one o'clock A.M., September 12th, when the artillery preparation was to commence. The 1st Battalion and the 73rd Machine Gun Company as a combat group were placed on the left to maintain liaison between the 89th Division and the 23rd Infantry, receiving their orders for this operation from the C.G., 3rd Brigade. The 3rd Battalion was placed on the right, the 2nd being in support. Ahead of this regiment was the 23rd Infantry. The movement to the "jumping off" place was made during a heavy rain and the roads were very muddy and blocked with traffic, but considering the immensity of the operation and the fact that the various units arrived in their places according to schedule, testified to the care with which the details had been previously worked out. The liaison between the units of this regiment and those on either flank was quickly established and down to and including platoon commanders all officers were advised of their location with relation to all others.

The mission of the Marine Brigade was the general support of the 3rd Brigade in executing the division's mission "first day" and to be prepared to pass through the 3rd Brigade, advance to the line "2nd day" and reconnoiter up to the exploitation line when ordered. The regimental limits were to be: Eastern - Lironville (exclusive); Limey (inclusive); Remenauville (exclusive); eastern edge of the Bois de l'Eveque (exclusive); unimproved road northern edge Bois de l'Eveque to Thianeourt-Rognieville road (inclusive); Thianeourt (inclusive); north of Bois-du-Fey (exclusive) - point 207.5 - northeast

through Bois-du-Rupt - Bois-de-la-Montagne and Hill 310.3, all exclusive to exploitation line. The Western: Limey (inclusive) - unimproved road extending north from Limey to Center of Bois-de-Euvzin - eastern edge of clearing between Bois-de-Beau-Vallon - Bois-de-Euvezin - Hill 264.3 (inclusive) - Thiaucourt (inclusive) - Xammes (exclusive) - Charey (inclusive). The regiment was to advance in two lines of battalions, each battalion in form with two companies in the first line and two companies in support. The advance of the regiment was to be made in rushes by successive bounds. The first bound was to be line of departure to the front line trenches. The second bound was to be the enemy's first positions; the third bound the enemy's intermediary or first combat positions; the fourth bound his second positions; and the fifth bound was to be the line "first phase." Each bound was to be initiated from the departure of the rear battalion of the 23rd Infantry from the objective of the bound. The regiment was to be at all times prepared to pass through the 23rd Infantry and to continue the attack. The first attack was to begin on "D" day at "H" hour. The artillery action was to begin on "D" day at "H" minus four hours. A rolling barrage was to precede the infantry advance at the rate of 100 meters in four minutes to the "first phase", where a standing barrage was to be put down in the foreground until "H" plus six hours, when a rolling barrage was to continue to the line "first day" at the rate of 100 meters in four minutes. One company of light tanks was to take position on "D" day at "H" hour minus four hours near the Lironville-Noviant road, head of column 500 meters south of Lironville. The following order was sent from Regimental Headquarters on September 11, 1918:

"1. Tomorrow, September 12th, is "D" day.

"H" hour is 5:00 A.M.

The artillery preparation will start at 1:00 A.M. and continue for four (4) hours. During this bombardment it is absolutely necessary that all men be kept under cover in designated positions.

2. You will march your command at the earliest practicable moment for your positions indicated; viz., 3rd Battalion in trenches on south edge of Limey - 2nd Battalion in trenches and works in ravine about 500 yards southwest of Limey. It is imperative that you be in position before the artillery preparation starts at 1:00 A.M.

3. Chemical warfare grenades and material will be found at dump west edge of Lironville. Details from platoons must be sent there to obtain these materials.

H.Lee, Colonel, USMC, Commanding."

The battalion commanders were, Major Frederick A. Barker, 1st Battalion; Major Ernest C. Williams, 2nd Battalion; Lieut. Col. Barton W. Sibley, 3rd Battalion.

The artillery preparation started at 1 A.M. as scheduled and was intense. For four hours the long range guns bombarded the enemy's back areas, while the lighter guns did terrific damage to front line and support positions. During this four-hour bombardment the troops lay in trenches near Limey in the heavy rain. At 5 A.M. the 23rd Infantry moved off from its "jumping-off" positions and was followed by this regiment. There had been little response to the American artillery preparation, and when the attack started there was no indication that the infantry was meeting heavy opposition. Perfect liaison was maintained. The advance continued uninterrupted across the hills to the north of Limey and at 8:30 the front lines of the regiment entered the Bois Haie l'Eveque. The C.O. of the 3rd Battalion sent the following message:

"From C.O. 3rd Bn.

At P.C. Date 12 September 18, 8:30 A.M.

To C.O., 6th.

Entering Bois Haie l'Eveque and still progressing.
Sibley."

In passing through the woods, some difficulty was encountered in maintaining liaison, but a halt at 9:30 enabled reorganization to be accomplished. Casualties were light, all being from shell fire. The advance on Thiaucourt was uninterrupted. The town was reached about 3 P.M., the 2nd Battalion passing through the town. The 3rd Battalion skirted the town to the west. The 82nd and 97th Companies of the 3rd Battalion had become somewhat detached. The 2nd Battalion took up a position north of Thiaucourt, after reorganizing. The following message from the C.O. of the 3rd Battalion indicates the position taken by that battalion and its condition:

"From: C.O., 3rd Bn.

At P.C. Date: 12 Sept. Hour: 4:00 P.M. No. 5.

To: C.O., 6th.

About an hour or two or more ago we passed to the north of Thiaucourt and took up position about 1000 yards behind 23rd Infantry with the two companies that remain with us. Enemy began shelling our lines, and infantry fell behind us. Now are in position again.

Our two missing companies have just reported in, and are being placed. However, all units are badly disorganized and out of position.

We need rations if possible, some ambulances for a few wounded, and counter artillery work. Artillery has been silent for several hours.

Sibley."

At this time the 23rd Infantry was about 1000 yards behind the Army line and was subjected to heavy direct artillery fire. A rearward movement was noticed and two companies of this battalion were pushed out to support the line. About 5 P.M. the original line was reestablished. This position in support of the 23rd Infantry was maintained throughout the night. Upon verbal orders from the Brigade Commander in Thiaucourt, at about 6:50 P.M., to send one battalion to protect the left flank of the 23rd Infantry, the 2nd Battalion was designated for this duty and moved out to position, and the following field message was sent to Brigade:

"6th Marines, Thiaucourt, 12 Sept. 18, 6:30 P.M. #12.
Commanding General, 4th Brigade.

2nd Battalion (Williams) has been ordered to take up a flank position running southwest at about 800 yards from 362.4-242.6, 3rd Battalion (Sibley) holds position to north of Thiaucourt 1000 yards in rear of 23rd Infantry. More details later. What is Barker's status? Our P.C. will be established at 7:30 P.M. in mayor's house.

H.Lee."

The 1st and 2nd Battalions returned to the regiment the next day. Upon receipt of Brigade field orders to relieve the 3rd Brigade in their position north of Thiaucourt, the relief was conducted as follows: The 1st Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion of 23rd Infantry at 8 P.M. Sept. 13th in support position along the Beney-Thiaucourt road; the 2nd Battalion relieved the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry in support position at 7 P.M.; the 3rd Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry in the forward position, advancing the first line to the Army line, and the reliefs were reported as follows:

"From C.O. 2nd Bn. At P.C., date 13 Sept. 18, hour 7 P.M.
Sent by runner to C.O. 6th Marines.

Relief complete. Sketch plan of company dispositions and battalion P.C.'s on reverse hereof.

Williams."

"From C.O., 1st Bn. 6th Regt.

At Toul-Thiaucourt railroad station, Sept. 13, 1918. Hour
8:45 P.M.

To: C.O. 6th Marines.

This battalion has relieved the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry. Relief completed at 8 P.M. Battalion holds support line along Beney-Thiaucourt road 361.9-362.5, except three platoons of 74th Company, which is 400 yards north of road. Order of companies from right to left - 74th, 76th, 75th and 95th Company in rear of 74th and 76th south of road. Battalion P.C. at R.R. station 362.8-246.4.

Barker."

The 3rd Battalion made the relief as indicated in the order sent to all company commanders of that battalion, as follows:

"From: C.O. 3rd Bn.

At: P.C.

13 Sept. 1918 - 6:00 P.M. No. 6.

To: C.O.'s All Companies.

In accordance with Regimental Orders the companies of this battalion will take over positions as reconnoitered this P.M.; 82nd Co. right front line, 83rd Co. left front line, 84th Co. left support, 97th Co. right support. This will be accomplished at dusk and completed at dark. Report to these headquarters as soon as relief is completed. One platoon of the 15th M.G.Co. will support right front Co.; another will support left front Co.; and another will be in reserve. Stokes mortar and one-pounder detachment will remain in reserve and will occupy position now held for present.

By order of Lt.Col.Sibley:

David Bellamy, Adj."

This relief was completed before midnight. Patrols were sent out and liaison was established. The only activities were those of patrols, although the enemy attempted intermittent harassing fire. In compliance with orders from the 4th Brigade Headquarters, received on the afternoon of September 14th, two companies were sent out from the 1st Battalion for the purpose of establishing outposts on the northern edge of the Bois de la Montagne and the woods to the west on the road Xammes-Cherey. The following field message was sent:

"From: C.O. 6th Marines, P.C.Thiaucourt, 14 Sept.
18. 5:40 P.M.

To: C.O. 3rd Battalion.

Operations Memorandum #2.

In compliance with verbal instructions from the Brigade Commander you will advance your line to the Army Line this evening as soon as light conditions are favorable. By this line is meant the high ground in your front extending from a point northwest of Jaulney to the north of Xammes. Arrange the disposition of your local supports to suit the terrain and your own judgment.

The 1st Battalion of this regiment is under orders to execute a reconnaissance to a point about two (2) kilometers to the front, and a copy of the memo is herewith enclosed for your information.

Lcc."

In reply to the above the following message was received from the C.O., 3rd Bn.:

"From: C.O. 3rd Bn. at P.C., date 14 Sept. 18.

To: C.O., 6th Marines.

In accordance with your operations memo #2 of 5:45 P.M. this date, the 82nd and 83rd our present front line. Cos. have been ordered to hold this position.

The 97th and 84th Cos. have been ordered to pass thru them jump off from Jaulny-Kammes road at 7:45 P.M. and to occupy the Army line. This P.C. will move forward with those two companies along the road passing through the center of the Regt. subsector. Final location will be reported later. An office P.C. will be maintained at the present location.

Sibley."

These moves were completed during the night. The 97th and 84th Companies of the 3rd Battalion occupied the forward positions. The 82nd and 83rd Companies were ordered to remain in position, on account of the difficulty of moving in the darkness. Two platoons of the 15th Machine Gun Company were ordered to support the new front line. Major Barker, with the 1st Battalion, moved north at 9 P.M. Both the new and the old line positions were shelled heavily by the enemy and at 11 P.M. airplanes dropped bombs in the vicinities of cross roads. Casualties were not heavy. At daylight on the morning of the 15th the 2nd Battalion, under Major Williams, passed through the 3rd Battalion and occupied the Bois la Montagne. The move drew heavy shell fire from the enemy.

Difficulty was encountered in maintaining liaison. The 2nd Battalion was separated into two bodies, one under Major Williams and the other under Captain Martin. These troops were without liaison for several hours during the morning, as was the 1st Battalion in the Bois de la Montagne. The 84th and 97th Companies of the 3rd Battalion sent patrols to locate them. The 2nd Battalion had moved into close proximity to the German lines and the enemy opened heavy machine gun fire. The 1st Battalion was placed in line on the right and left flanks of the 2nd Battalion; the 76th Company on the right flank, with the 74th Company in support and the 75th Company with the 95th Company on the left flank. The 3rd Battalion was ordered to reinforce the 2nd Battalion at 10:30 A.M. and two platoons were sent from the 83rd Company for this duty. A heavy artillery barrage from the long range guns of the forts near Metz was put down on the 2nd Battalion and the reinforcing platoons. The enemy also attempted a counterattack, but was repulsed by rifle and machine gun fire by the 1st and 2nd Battalions and the two platoons of the 83rd Company. These two platoons were recalled to their company at 6:00 P.M. The entire sector was heavily shelled during the whole day of September 15th. Casualties were comparatively light.

Information was received from Brigade Headquarters on the morning of September 15th that the 5th Marines had been ordered to establish a line from the north edge of Bois-de-Halbat to Bois-de-la-Montagne and to establish liaison with this regiment, which was on the left of the 5th. The 89th Division was ordered forward. This regiment was ordered to establish combat liaison with the 5th Regiment on the right and 89th Division on the left.

The following field messages from Regimental Headquarters were sent to the C.O.'s 2nd and 3rd Battalions:

"From: C.O. 6th Marines at P.C. Thiaucourt, 15 Sept. 18
2:12 A.M.

To: C.O. 2nd Bn. 6th Marines.

You will proceed immediately with your Bn. and M.G.Co. north and occupy the line from Xammes-Charcy road eastward across the southern edge of the woods lying between Xammes and Charcy along the unimproved road running east and west through the Bois-de-la-Montagne and the X - line 244.3 from Hill 231.5.

Lee."

"From: C.O. 6th Marines at P.C. Thiaucourt, 15 Sept. 18.
2:15 A.M.

To: C.O., 3rd Bn., 6th Marines.

Things seem to be going well up at the front. The 6th Infantry (5th Division) is digging in at Fombercourt. The 89th Division is ordered forward. The 5th Marines are holding outpost line from Bois-de-la-Montagne east. The 6th (1st battalion) is holding line north edge Bois-de-la-Montagne and woods to west. Barker's other two companies are moving forward to reinforce him on that line. Williams is moving up to south edge of Bois-de-le-Montagne. You remain on Army Line in reserve.

Lee."

The troops were moved to the positions indicated and encountered the enemy in the Bois-de-la-Montagne and in the woods to the west. After skirmishing throughout these woods the enemy was driven north. When this regiment occupied the north edge of the woods, it was confronted with strong machine gun positions located in the works just north of the small works to the north of the Bois-de-la-Montagne and Montplaisir Ferme. Several pill boxes were taken in the wire east of Montplaisir Ferme. During the first of this advance the enemy was unable to use his artillery with effect because of his lack of knowledge as to the location of his own troops. For a time the left flank of this regiment was in the air on account of the 89th Division failing to advance. After some difficulty the lines were connected. The enemy made three heated counterattacks before nightfall, but was repulsed. Each of these attacks was preceded by brief but violent artillery preparation. These attacks were directed against the positions of this regiment in the north of woods. The enemy's losses were considerable in these three assaults, this regiment sustaining heavier losses in this operation than in any other since the offensive began. In the four days' offensive, Captain W. D. Black, 95th Company, and Lieutenants Simmonds, Kilguff and Stockwell, of the 2nd Battalion, were killed, and thirteen officers wounded. In this offensive the regiment lost approximately four hundred and twenty-one men and officers killed and wounded.

Information regarding the strength of the enemy's strongholds in this sector, received before the grand offensive began, proved not to have been exaggerated. Only the terrific four-hour preparation of the morning of September 12th made the first stages of the operation possible without serious opposition. The area of this regiment had included several woods, which were well fortified. Evidence of the completeness with which the artillery had been informed regarding enemy pill boxes, strongholds and defenses, was borne out by the havoc wrought upon them. The enemy had been driven into dugouts and trenches by the bombardment and those who did not retreat as the barrage advanced were taken prisoners. The town of Thiaucourt, in which regimental Headquarters was established the first afternoon, was some nine kilometers within the German lines. The people of this town had been prisoners of the Germans since the early days of the Great War. Their sudden and unexpected release from captivity gave them cause for jubilation. Thiaucourt was shelled quite heavily by the enemy after he had been driven out. In the town the enemy had warehouses, which were captured, with quantities of clothing and ordnance intact. The enemy was undoubtedly engaged in further strengthening his positions when the offensive began. Spacious dugouts of concrete, reinforced with steel, a narrow gauge railway, rolling stock, cement mixers and large quantities of sand and gravel were captured. Big gun pits were in the course of construction. Many horses and some wagons were captured. This regiment was relieved during the night of September 15th-16th by the 310th Regiment of the 78th Division and proceeded by march to Minerville and vicinity, where a number of officers reported from schools. On September 18th Lieut. Colonel Sibley was evacuated to hospital with eye trouble. Captain George K. Shuler assumed command of the 3rd Battalion. The regiment proceeded by march on the night of September 20th and arrived at Foug during the night, where Regimental Headquarters was established. The battalions were billeted in towns around Foug. Drill schedules were put into

effect. One-day liberties were granted to the officers and men to Toul.

The regiment entrained on September 27th for a new area, arriving at Chalon-sur-Marne late in the afternoon. It detrained and proceeded to Chopy, where Regimental Headquarters was established. The battalions were billeted in nearby towns. On the night of September 29th the regiment proceeded by camions to Somme-Suippes, where it detrained in a heavy rain. The regiment was now in the Champagne sector, which was one of the last of the old German lines, well fortified, and held with determination by the enemy in view of its strategical value. The regiment marched to trenches near Suippes, where it bivouaced for the night. In spite of the early autumn chill and the rain, the men slept for several hours on the wet ground. At noon hot rations were served and the spirits of the men revived. This position, which the French had constructed as a part of their reserve defenses, was occupied until late in the afternoon of October 1st, when the regiment was ordered forward to relieve the French in the front lines north of Somme-Py. Twenty per cent of the regiment was left behind in compliance with divisional orders. Ammunition and pyrotechnics were picked up on the march, which was for twelve kilometers, on roads blocked with traffic. The 2nd Battalion took over the first of four parallel lines of trenches, De Krefeld, the companies being placed from right to left, 79th Co., 80th Co. and 78th Co. The 96th Company on the left occupied the Bayou de Bromberg. Between the 96th Company and the 78th Company the enemy held trench De l'Elbe. More in advance the enemy also held trench Du Pache, trench de l'Elbe and trench D'Essen, and annoyed the companies of the 2nd Battalion with his machine gun fire. Liaison was established between the French on the left and the 2nd Battalion, French troops being intermingled with the 96th Company. On the right of the 2nd Battalion was the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines, Major George W. Hamilton commanding, in trench Des Prussien. The 1st Battalion, of the 6th Regiment, took position 800 meters in rear of the 2nd Battalion, with the 73rd Machine Gun Company attached for combat purposes. The 3rd Battalion took position 1000 yards in rear of the 1st, in trenches Dusseldorf and Gottingue. The 15th Machine Gun Company was attached to the 3rd Battalion.

This sector, the scene of many previous hard-fought battles, had been subjected to heavy artillery fire for months, which, added to the natural condition of the terrain, produced a condition of unusual barrenness and devastation. The surface soil was very thin and the network of trenches and shell craters had turned to the surface the chalky earth which underlay it. There was little vegetation, and what there was consisted mainly of stunted trees, practically all of which had been cut by shell fire. Blanc Mont, in the rear of the German front line, was a commanding eminence with sufficient foliage to conceal troop movements. It was known to be strongly fortified with machine gun nests and well-constructed trenches dug into the chalk rock and strengthened with concrete. The troops had not been in the trenches but a few hours when they were covered with the white mud, which, when it dried, turned to an annoying powder.

Blanc Mont was the keystone stronghold of the entire sector. If taken, the Germans would be forced to evacuate Rheims and the Leon district. This stronghold was directly in this regiment's area. In addition to the Second Division, choice French units, consisting partly of Alpine Chasseurs, were aiding in this offensive. At the beginning of the offensive Suippes and Somme-Suippes, two fairly large French towns, were under shell fire. These towns had been evacuated of civilians since early in the war. The Germans who had occupied Suippes earlier in the war had mined practically all the houses of the town by discharging explosives in the cellars, blowing up the interiors, and while the town had the appearance of being in fairly good condition, the houses were mere shells. However, the town was used for billeting troops.

During the afternoon of October 2nd the Stokes mortar and one-pounder sections were sent to aid the 96th Company on the left of the 2nd Battalion, to assist against the enemy's strong point at the junction of Boy-des-Hohenzollern and principal parallels, from which his machine gun fire menaced the left flank. In substance, the following order was sent to all company commanders of the 2nd Battalion in the front line at 4:20 P.M.: "At 6:30 P.M. you will occupy, by infiltration, the trenches Du Pache, de l'Elbe and D'Essen. Two platoons will be used initially, followed by the other two as successive trenches are reached. Consolidate and hold with two platoons in front trenches and two in rear." In addition the limits of each company's occupancy were clearly defined. This movement was executed as scheduled and the following message, written at 8 P.M., from Lieut. Cates, commanding the 96th Company, and who had the difficult flank, explains the situation: "Attack a success. Few losses. Consolidated. Liaison with 78th on right and French on left. Everything in good shape."

It had been planned to attack on October 2nd, but plans were changed, and 5:30 A.M. October 3rd was set for the assault. The 2nd Battalion had greatly improved its position from which to attack when it connected up its lines in the changes in the afternoon of October 2nd. The regiment was to advance in three echelons to the north and west against the positions held by the enemy in the immediate front in trenches Pache and D'Essen, then a little west of north to include Blanc Mont. The 2nd Battalion was to lead with two front companies in its front line and two in local support, followed by the 1st and 3rd Battalions respectively, at about 1000 meters, similarly disposed. Careful instructions were given to guard the left flank for the entire advance to Blanc Mont and to maintain liaison with the infantry on the right. The 3rd Brigade, consisting of the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments, was to attack on the right of the Marine Brigade. The 5th Regiment, Marines, was to support this regiment. Packs were ordered to be left at the "jumping-off" place. The regimental commander gave the following instructions in a field order, regarding the use of rifles: "Impress all men with the fact that musketry is still KING and they have but to sit tight and shoot straight, insuring superiority of fire and guaranteeing success."

There was to be a five-minutes' artillery preparation before the infantry attack, and a rolling barrage was to precede the infantry at the rate of 100 meters in four minutes to the objective, where a standing barrage was to be put down 300 meters beyond the objective for thirty minutes, when a rolling barrage was to continue for 1400 meters further for the support of patrols and to enable outposts to be established. One company of tanks, twelve in number, was assigned to the 2nd Battalion and twelve tanks to the 1st Battalion in the second line taking position in rear of the right and left flanks to repel counter attacks.

The regiment attacked as scheduled, but the French on the left failed to advance. Progress was excellent. Machine gun fire directed at the 2nd Battalion as it cleared the parallel of departure caused some casualties. For a short time the enemy put down a counterbarrage, but shortly began moving back his guns, and artillery opposition became feeble. The American barrage was excellent and the men of the leading battalion followed it closely, even risking approaching too closely in order to silence an occasional too troublesome machine gun. Many enemy machine guns were encountered, but they failed to hinder the advance. At 8:30 A.M. the C.O. of the 2nd Battalion sent the following message: "Objective reached at 8:30 A.M. Position now being consolidated. From first information casualties appear to have been light and the bag of prisoners good. Spirits of all very high. Barrage was beautiful. Williams."

Owing to the fact that the French had not advanced on the left, that flank was left exposed and unsupported, except through measures taken by echelons of this regiment. Conditions developed as indicated in the following messages, which also explain the situation at the end of the first phase of the attack:

"From: C.O. 3rd Battalion.
3 Oct. 11:43 A.M. No. 7 By runner.
To: C.O. 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines.

I have ordered my 84th Co. to take up position extending from our left line northeast to 266.5 - 280.0. My line extends from our left line northeast to 266.5 - 280.0. My line extends from there to 267.6 - 280.3. I can help you support the left. Advise me what position would be best. Will you inform this runner of the location of Barker's P.C. and disposition of his companies if possible? Shuler."

"From: C.O. 3rd Battalion.
3 Oct. 11:50 A.M. No. 9 By runner.
To: C.O. 2nd Bn. 6th Marines.

Officers from 2nd Battalion 5th Regiment just came here and showed me orders for Messersmith to fill in gap between 6th Marines on left and the French. He is proceeding to do so. Shuler."

"From: C.O. 3rd Battalion.
2 Oct. 12:10 P.M. No. 10 By runner.
To: C.O. 1st Bn. 6th Regiment.

My P.C. 267.2 - 279.6, in trench. I am now getting my line established from 267.3 to 280.6 to 286.1 to 279.7. Just received message from Williams stating enemy was circling left and asking for help. At same time this message was received Messersmith, commanding 2nd Battalion 5th Marines, showed me his orders to immediately fill up any gap between 6th Marines and French on our left. Shuler."

"From: C.O. 1st Battalion at P.C.
3 Oct. 18 11:30 A.M. No. 11 By runner.
To: C.O. 3rd Bn., 6th Marines.

Have reached our objective and consolidating line. 2nd Battalion on our left, 23rd Infantry on right. Left flank exposed. Expect counterattack. Have you seen 5th Marines? Let us know your exact position of P.C. and your companies. Barker."

"From: C.O. 3rd Battalion.
3 Oct. 11:55 A.M. No. 8 By runner.
To: C.O. 6th Regiment.

The following message just received from Major Williams: "We need support on our left flank. The French have not come up and our left is in the air. The enemy about 700 or 800 strong are going around our left and threaten an encircling movement. Can you give us any help?" I sent message to Williams that I would give him support and asked his advice as to location for same. Between sending that message and writing this one Messersmith, commanding 2nd Bn. 5th Regiment, showed me his orders from Commanding Officer, 5th Regiment 'To immediately fill in any gap between 6th Regiment and the French on our left.' His order was to do so without further orders. I have sent Major Williams' runner to Messersmith to take back any message and have sent message to Major Williams informing him of Messersmith's orders. Shuler."

"From: C.O. 3rd Battalion.
3 Oct. 1:30 P.M. No. 11 By runner.
To: C.O. 1st Bn.

My companies disposed as sketch shows. According to your coordinates farthest point on my line is about 800 meters in your rear with good communication through trench D'Ausbourg. However, if you want line closer can move it forward. Give me any idea of where you would like my line to better support you. Shuler."

"From: C.O. 1st Battalion. At P.C.
3 Oct. 18. 12:40 No. 13 By runner.
To: C.O. 3rd Bn.

1st and 2nd Bns. on front line with no support. In need of a support line. Can you help us out? Barker."

Enemy machine guns, one-pounders and mortars on the left open flank proved very troublesome. Realizing that the advance was at

an end, enemy artillery again took position to the front and his pieces of 88 caliber proved troublesome. Tanks assisted some in repelling a counterattack on the left. The machine gunners of this regiment proved equal to the counter-blow, which was repulsed, enemy losses being heavy. A summary of the various phases of this advance shows that the following situation had developed. The advance of this regiment had been uninterrupted to the objective on the Blanc Mont ridge and when the French on the left had failed to advance, leaving an exposed flank, the leading battalions of this regiment, in order to keep in touch with the Brigade on the right, had veered slightly to the right, and the dense woods on and approaching Blanc Mont had not been cleared of enemy machine guns. It was to protect this flank that the line of the 3rd Battalion was swung in a partial semicircle as support to the left as indicated in the preceding messages.

During the afternoon the 22nd Division, French, crossed the rear of this regiment from the right and began cleaning up the woods on the left flank, from which a great deal of machine gun fire had continued to enfilade the left positions of this regiment. Elements 107th Division, French, also came up in support.

The following order was issued from the Headquarters of the 6th Regiment at 3:45 P.M.

"Information has been received that the French division on our left has advanced. Our division will move forward at about 4:00 P.M. and occupy the ridge to the eastward and southeastward of St. Etienne. The 5th Regiment will pass through the 6th Regiment in its present position and will advance to the new objective. When the 5th Regiment has passed through the Bns. of this regiment will immediately reform and be prepared to follow the 5th at a distance of about 1 kilometer should their advance make that necessary. This regiment will advance in column of Bns. in the order - Barker (1st), Williams (2nd), Shuler (3), and will assure the protection of the left flank of the 5th Regiment. Should the rear Bn. of the 5th Regiment not advance more than one kilometer from the present position, this regiment will remain in place and assure the protection of the left flank. Lee."

The advance of the 5th Regiment as described in this order did not, however, take place on this date. It was effected on the morning of October 4th. The advance met with determined resistance and the elements of the 6th Regiment on the ridge east of Blanc Mont and the 5th Regt. advancing to the north of this ridge were subjected to terrific machine gun fire from Blanc Mont woods. The left flank was protected during the night of October 3rd-4th by liaison patrols which connected up with the French. Water carts and ration carts with hot food were brought up to the men in the trenches during the evening. The work of the Quartermaster throughout the Champagne offensive was very effective, hot food being supplied at least once a day.

The 5th Regiment started to advance early on the morning of October 4th without artillery preparation. Heavy enemy artillery fire was encountered and after going about two kilometers further advance was impossible, because of terrific machine gun resistance. Major Messersmith, of the 5th Regiment, reported at 8:30 A.M.: "20th Company held up by heavy fire on left sector along road. The company needs assistance, and I have none to send. What can you do for us?" The message was referred to the 5th Regiment.

It was planned for this regiment to advance at 2:30 P.M.; the 22nd Division, French, had advanced at 9:50 A.M. and had skirted Blanc Mont to the westward, leaving that stronghold in the hands of the enemy. An error in a coordinance report had led to the belief that that stronghold was held by this regiment. The following message was received from the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion:

"From: C.O. 2nd Bn. At.P.C.
4 Oct. 18. 1:55 P.M. No. 1. By runner.
To: C.O. 6th Marines.

The limits now actually held by this Bn. are eastern, 266.9 - 281.2; western 266.2 - 280.7, instead of as previously reported. Location of barracks and roads on our left flank (present) confused us with what should actually have been our left flank, about 450 meters more to the left. The enemy consequently holds a good portion of Blanc Mont and is about 150 yards distant from the lines we hold along our eastern flank. Their position here is heavily held with machine guns and exposure at this point in daylight hours subjects the men to heavy sniping from his position, which is as commanding as our own. The enemy covers the low ground in front of us with his machine gun fire and advance without heavy losses on this flank is impossible without heavy artillery preparation on his position on our left or until the French advance on our left and take this position. Our effectives are approximately as follows: 78th Co. - 95, 80th Co. - 60, 96th Co. - 65, 79th Co. - 85. Casualties in officers about 40%. Williams."

This verified the fact that the Blanc Mont stronghold had not been reduced and was still a menace on the left. The 3rd Battalion advanced at 2:30 P.M. until it approached the 1st Battalion, which was still in the vicinity of the ridge road, and halted. The 2nd Battalion was unable to advance on account of machine gun fire on the left. It was decided to concentrate heavy artillery fire on the enemy stronghold, after which the 3rd Battalion was to attack. At 4:35 P.M. the C.O. of the 3rd Battalion sent the following message:

"From: C.O. 3rd Battalion.
4 Oct. 18. 4:35 P.M. No. 3. By runner.
To: C.O. 6th Regiment.

It is impossible to clean out Blanc Mont without adequate artillery preparations. There has been no real heavy artillery fire put in the woods up to the present time. They are now firing an occasional seventy-five, which is not effective. Machine guns are firing from there all the time. It is strongly held. I have ordered C.O. 97th Co. to use his judgment about taking machine gun nests. It will require a heavy concentration to properly prepare for an attack. A concentration of one half kilometer around the words 'Blanc Mont' (Tachure map 1/30,000) would be right. Will call you up as soon as phone is working. Skuler."

Verbal messages were delivered to the companies near Blanc Mont "Fall back to road; if possible at 6:30 P.M." The companies fell back, but only after they had captured some machine gun nests. The assault was deferred until the next day, and during the night a harassing fire was kept up in order to demoralize the enemy. At 5:15 a concentration of 155's, lasting an hour, was placed in the woods. The following order was issued at 9:27 P.M., October 4, 1918:

"Headquarters, 6th Regiment,
Marine Corps, A.E.F.,
France, 4 Oct. 18.

FIELD ORDERS

1. The enemy has established a machine gun nest on Blanc Mont.
2. The 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, will attack and drive the enemy from this position.
3. (a) Artillery preparation with 155's and 75's will be given between 5:15 A.M. and 6:15 A.M., 5 October, firing on the area included between the points 265.79 - 281.0; 266.04 - 281.12; 265.9 - 280.3; 266.2 - 280.4; and after 6:15 A.M. artillery will rake woods to the north of this area.
(b) The 3rd Battalion will be in position to attack at 6:15 A.M. and will attack as soon as the artillery fire shifts to the north of the occupied area.

4. Messages to present F.O. of 3rd Battalion and thence by telephone to Regimental F.O.

Lee.

Copies to: C.O. 1st Bn. 6th Marines; C.O. 2nd Bn. 6th Marines;
C.O. 3rd Bn. 6th Marines; C.G. 4th Brigade; C.O. 5th
Marines; C.G. 23rd Div.(French); 170th Inf.(French)."

In accordance with this order the 3rd Battalion attacked at 6:15 A.M., advancing on left flank from the east; 97th, 82nd and 83rd on line and 84th in support. At 7:35 A.M. word was received from 82nd, 83rd and 97th Companies that their objective, that portion of Blanc Mont which had not already been taken, was reached, and that they were digging in. During this short engagement they captured four officers, 289 prisoners, 80 machine guns, and a number of trench mortars and other material. No casualties were sustained.

In compliance with orders from Headquarters, Second Division, the following order, in substance, was issued to all battalions at 8:45 A.M.; "This regiment will be organized at once and be prepared to pass through the 5th Marines when ordered. Order of battalions, front to rear, Williams (2nd); Shuler (3rd); Barker (1st)." Ammunition was issued. At 12:50 P.M. the C.O. of the 2nd Battalion was ordered on the telephone, "The 6th Regiment advances at once. Advance to St. Etienne, keeping liaison with French on our left and the 3rd Brigade on our right. French have already advanced. Halt at St. Etienne and await orders." Later orders were given verbally to Major Williams to halt his battalion at ridge, northeast of St. Etienne. At about 3 P.M. the regiment moved forward, the 2nd Battalion leading, covering a sector almost a kilometer and a half in width. The regiment, by this time, had been greatly depleted by casualties. The 2nd Battalion had only a few more than three hundred effectives on this wide front. On the left the objective of this new advance was attained. On the right a battalion of the 23rd Infantry was found to be in this regiment's sector. The commanding officer of this infantry battalion strongly advised Lieut. West, commanding the 79th Company, not to attempt a further advance because, he said, strong machine gun nests made progress without artillery preparation impossible and that his command had been badly cut up in trying to take the position. Lieut. West, however, attacked with his company, and was carried from the field severely wounded. Lieut. Cates, of the 96th Company, took command on the right and drew back to the line held by the infantry. The Regiment Commander ordered a halt and not to attempt further advance. During the night the 3rd Battalion relieved the 2nd in the first line and the 2nd Battalion moved back to the 3rd line. The 1st Battalion took position in the second line.

At 1 A.M., October 6th, time was moved back one hour. At 1:30 A.M. the following field order was issued:

"Headquarters, 6th Regiment,
Marine Corps, American E.F.,
France, 6 October 18.
Hour 1:30 A.M.

FIELD ORDER NO.

MAP - S.T.G.A. 1/20000

1. The enemy occupies three machine gun nests in the sector of this division about 500 yards north of our line.

2. The 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, operating in conjunction with the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry on its right, will attack and capture or destroy the enemy and occupy the position.

3. (a) The attack begins at 6:30 A.M. and is preceded by one hour's artillery preparation as indicated in artillery program attached. At 6:30 A.M. an artillery barrage will move forward to the line indicated in the artillery program, where it remains until 7:00 A.M.

(b) Boundary limits - eastern: the eastern limit of regimental subsector. Western: western limit of division sector.

(c) Upon obtaining the objective the troops will consolidate the line indicated in red in attached sketch.

4. Messages to Regimental P.C.

Lee."

The 3rd Battalion was to advance to the second line of trenches east of St.Etienne. The advance was begun at 6:30 A.M., October 6th, and an hour later the objective was reached. The casualties in the battalion were approximately 35 to 40% of the effectives engaged, mostly from machine gun fire. After the attack liaison was established on the right with the 23rd Infantry and on left with 62nd Regiment (French). At 3:00 P.M., however, the French evacuated St.Etienne, leaving the left flank exposed.

The battalion commanders were ordered to furnish guides for the different platoons of the 142nd Infantry, 36th American Division, which was to relieve this regiment. This was the first time the troops of the 36th Division had been in the lines and although the 142nd Regiment arrived at the positions held by this regiment during the night of October 6th, this regiment was ordered to stand fast until further orders. All units of the 142nd were in place with the units of this regiment by 6 A.M. October 7th.

During the night of October 6th-7th combat liaison was established with the French troops on the left, who during the night reentered St.Etienne. The French commanding officer informed the commanding officer of this regiment that his regiment held all of the town, and that his right was near the cemetery to the east of the town. He also requested that the gap between his right and the left of this regiment be closed up by troops of this regiment. On the morning of October 7th patrols and scouts were sent out from the 3rd Battalion to obtain information regarding the width, depth and character of the banks, of the small stream running through St. Etienne; also information as to whether the enemy had withdrawn from this regimental front. These patrols reported that the stream was narrow and that the banks afforded easy crossing.

From the continual shell fire and machine gun harassing to which the front lines of this regiment were continually subjected, it was evident that the enemy was still in contact with this regiment. In fact, for three days the light and heavy artillery of the enemy played at will upon the front line positions. The trenches, the position of which were known to him, battalion P.C.'s and the lines of communication were continually shelled. The enemy was able by direct observation to fire at men in the trenches and even to snipe at runners or any other target with their 88 cal. guns. This regiment suffered serious casualties from this fire. During the first two days that the hill southeast of St.Etienne was occupied by the regimental front lines the troops of this regiment were continually harassed by machine guns. This continued shell fire told greatly upon the spirits of the men, who had been in the open for over a week without blankets, with a scanty supply of water and with but one warm meal a day. At 11 A.M. October 7th the 83rd Company reported that one of its platoons had found Germans in the trenches to the right of the town and the following message, which was received from Lieut. Noble in charge of the platoon, was forwarded at 2:40 P.M. by the C.O. of the 3rd Battalion to Regimental Headquarters: "It is estimated that at least two hundred of enemy are still in town, and more are seen filtering from over the hill into the town. It is believed that they are trying to filter in to the northeast end of town and drive the remaining French out. Their barrage did not play on part of town to the northeast of church. They occupy trench near the town, between us and the town. They are probably trying to strike the French right flank and later our left flank. It is believed necessary for the Americans to advance some troops (probably a battalion) to occupy trench between us and the town as soon as possible, or else advance here soon. A.H.Noble." During the night of October 7th-8th the 1st Battalion

of this regiment occupied the gap between the French and the left of this regiment mentioned in the message just quoted. The 76th Company of the 1st Battalion went into the town of St. Etienne with the 74th, 75th and 95th Companies in support. While occupying this position the 1st Battalion repulsed two strong counterattacks, during which it suffered many casualties, but inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy.

At 5:05 A.M. October 6th the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion of the 142nd Regiment, whose battalion was in line with the 3rd Battalion of this regiment, and whose battalion was badly disorganized, received orders to attack at 5:45 A.M., the objective being Courey. After a heavy barrage, that battalion, supported by tanks, advanced upon the German position. They cleaned out the machine gun nests on the right front and established a line east of St. Etienne about one kilometer from the "jumping off" position. They sustained very heavy losses, took some prisoners and became entirely disorganized. This regiment did not advance. The physical condition of the men was becoming very bad, although the spirit was excellent. At 5 P.M. a very heavy barrage was placed just back of the new line established by the 142nd Regiment, producing a heavy concentration of high explosive gas. As a result the men holding that line retreated through the barrage and through the front lines of this regiment, thus losing the ground gained in the morning. The officers and noncommissioned officers of this regiment did much in organizing the stragglers and instructing them to dig in. A new line was established and the strong points in the woods on the right front, former enemy machine gun nests, were organized into this line. The positions were heavily shelled all day and night, and at 5 A.M., October 9th, a heavy enemy barrage was placed on the front line positions, but there was no attack. The 142nd Regiment, 36th Division, was partially successful in reorganizing and taking up the line in front of this regiment.

Orders were issued about noon of October 9th for the relief of this regiment, and during the night it marched to the Suippes area, where it arrived about 8 A.M., having halted on the march for breakfast. During the entire operation in the Champagne sector the front echelon of this regiment was annoyed and suffered some losses through the artillery fire of the enemy directed from positions on both flanks. At times it was reported to the Headquarters of this regiment that American artillery fire was firing short. Inquiry developed the fact that friendly artillery was not firing in that particular sub-sector, and it is more than probable that the enemy fire from the flank in the nature of enfilade and falling just in front or in rear of the line, gave the impression to those upon whom the fire was directed that it was friendly artillery.

The ten days spent in the Champagne sector were in many respects the most exhausting to which the troops of this regiment had been subjected. The men had left their packs at the "jumping off" place and the nights and mornings were cold; and in addition they were continually harassed by enemy artillery of every caliber. The losses of the 6th Regiment were thirty-three officers killed and wounded, eight hundred and forty-nine men killed and wounded; the total loss of the regiment, including killed, wounded and missing, officers and men, being nine hundred and forty.

Regimental Headquarters was located in Suippes on October 10th and the battalions were stationed around Suippes. While in this area the troops were given baths and their clothing deloused. On October 14th Regimental Headquarters moved to Bouy and the battalions were billeted in surrounding camps and towns. The regiment received replacements, drills were resumed, and new clothing was issued. Good food and sufficient rest revived the spirits of the men wonderfully. A certain percentage of the officers and men were granted liberty each day to Chalons-sur-Marne. Admiral Mayo of the Navy and Major General Lejeune, commanding the second Division, reviewed the regiment while in this area. On October 19th the Marine

Brigade was placed provisionally at the disposal of the IX Army Corps, French, to hold the sector of the 73rd Division, French, in the region Attigny - Voneq - Aisne River. The orders provided for a march of the Brigade on October 20th to the area Suippes - Nantivet Somme-Suippes and adjacent camps, where further orders were to be received from the IX Army Corps, French; the Second Division was to provide the necessary signal and medical service to enable the Brigade to function independently. This regiment marched during a cold rain to Suippes and adjacent camps, where it billeted for the night, and early on the morning of October 21st, with ideal weather conditions, began the march to Leffincourt - Mozagran - Medeah Farm area. It was the intention to dispose of the Brigade in the new area in proper position for taking over the line as follows: 5th Regiment on the right; 6th Regiment on the left; each regiment in column of battalions; a machine gun company assigned to each battalion. Owing to the distance, approximately forty kilometers, and march conditions existing, all organizations did not reach their assigned positions on that date. It was arranged for the 5th Regiment to relieve the 367th R.I. in the right sector with two battalions and for the 6th Regiment to relieve the 556th R.I. in the left subsector with two battalions. The remaining two battalions were to be held in reserve at Leffincourt. Orders were issued for the preliminary reconnaissance of this sector on the night of 21st-22nd October.

At 8:45 P.M. the Marine Brigade received the following telephone message through the 73rd D.I., French: "Stop reconnaissance by the American Brigade. The relief will be made on the same day but by the elements of the 36th Division. No change for the artillery." This regiment was ordered to remain in place after it had concentrated all troops within an assigned area. On October 22nd the Brigade was ordered to rejoin the 1st Army and to march to the area Sousin - Forthes and camps southward, thence to Valmy - Aube area. At this area orders were to be received from the American 1st Army, but while in the first named area orders were received from the Commanding General, Second Division, countermanding the movement, which indicated that the Brigade had rejoined the Second Division.

These movements taxed the endurance of the troops to the utmost, but a very good idea was obtained as to the marching endurance of the Brigade. The units marched for eighty to one hundred and ten kilometers in four days with one day of rest included, a large part of the march being made under bad weather conditions. Remarkably few men were evicted with foot trouble, but on the last day about twenty per cent of the command marched with difficulty and conditions were beginning to grow serious. The trouble was mainly due to English shoes, which had been issued just before leaving the Buoy area on the 20th of October. Replacements recently joined stood the marches very well, all things considered. However this regiment could not have continued the movement by marching on the 24th of October without its combat efficiency being seriously effected. Regimental Headquarters was established at Camp Montpellier on October 23rd. Here the men were allowed to rest, clean up and give attention to their feet after the strenuous hike. Three hot meals went far toward reviving the spirits of the troops.

On the morning of October 25th the regiment embussed in camions at Somme-Suippes, at 8 A.M., and proceeded to Les Islettes, where it was debussed and marched to camps along the Les Islettes-Losheres-Croix de Pierre road about five kilometers north-northeast of Les Islettes. Here the regiment camped until 3 P.M. of the following day, with Regimental Headquarters at Camp Lenhart. On the afternoon of October 26th this regiment marched through the Argonne Forest, over difficult roads, and arrived early on the morning of October 27th in an area south of Exermont. The troops were bivouaced in the woods west to the Exermont-Chaudron Farm road and Regimental Headquarters was located at Chaudron Farm. The regiment remained in this area for four days, during which time the men were given a much-needed rest. The nights and mornings were cold, but the days were bright and comfortably warm, and the men had their full equip-

ment - blankets and overcoats.

Many reconnaissances were made of the front lines by the Intelligence personnel and company officers and noncommissioned officers. The enemy had been pushed out of the Aronne Forest by the First American Army and the grand offensive, which was to push him across the Meuse and seize the important line of railroad communication between Metz and Mezieres, and render helpless the Crown Prince's army in the district of Rheims, was to begin. While bivouaced in the woods the regiment was subjected to some long range fire and there was some activity in the air. Enemy aviators paid nightly visits and dropped bombs. During the daytime enemy fliers paid much attention to Allied observation balloons and several of them were brought down. A large number of Allied anti-aircraft guns were in this area and during the hours in which observation was possible an almost constant anti-aircraft barrage was kept up. Enemy fliers also dropped much propaganda, serving to break the monotony of the stay in the woods.

The Regimental Commander held daily conferences with the battalion commanders and explained the duties of all of the units of the regiment at the different stages of the proposed attack. The battalion commanders in turn explained the plan of the attack to all subordinate commanders, until practically all of the officers and noncommissioned officers of the regiment were familiar with the plan of attack, and each knew the task that was to be allotted to him during the different stages of the attack. On the 29th of October the Regiment was issued twenty-five Browning automatic rifles.

On the night of October 30th-31st the Regiment moved up into the forward area, the 3rd Battalion of this regiment relieving the support battalion of the 166th Infantry in a position on the southern slope of a high hill a kilometer and a half south-southeast of Sommerance. The 2nd Battalion relieved the reserve battalion of the 166th Infantry in position on the hill a half kilometer north of Exermont. The 1st Battalion took up a position in the vicinity of Sommerance. Regimental Headquarters remained at Chaudron Farm until one P.M. of October 31st, when it moved to the P.C. of the 166th Infantry. In accordance with a field order, Headquarters, Fourth Brigade, October 31st, 1918, the Regimental Commander assumed the command of the subsector formerly held by the 166th Infantry. At about 10 P.M. of October 31st the battalions of this regiment moved up into position preparatory to the "jump-off". Enemy artillery was quiet and the movement was executed without difficulty. The 1st Battalion took a position just in rear of the front line. The 3rd Battalion took a position in the area just north of Sommerance; and the 2nd Battalion took a position in a ravine one kilometer south of Sommerance. The liaison detachment consisted of the 95th Company of this regiment, a company of the 80th Division and a platoon of the 73rd Machine Gun Company, under command of Major George A. Stowell. This detachment took up a position on the left of the 1st Battalion.

With the 1st Battalion on the front line, the 3rd Battalion in the second line and the 2nd Battalion in the third line, the regiment was to attack at 5:30 A.M. November 1st. The 80th Division was on the left and the 5th Marines on the right. This regiment was to advance in a north-northeasterly direction and was to capture the towns of St. Georges, Landres et St. Georges, Landreville, Chenery and Bayonville et Chenery. The objective for the first day's operation was some nine kilometers from the "jumping-off" place. The terrain was rolling, broken by an occasional patch of woods, consisting mostly of stunted trees and underbrush. The enemy had artillery in many of the small ravines which passed through this sector. The amount of field artillery, French and American, used in this grand offensive compared favorably with that of the St. Mihiel drive, especially of 75's and 105's.

Allied batteries were fairly active throughout the night and at 3:30 A.M. the two hours' preparation commenced. The enemy countered to an appreciable extent. At about 5:30 A.M. a standing barrage was

laid down in front of the "jumping off" line and continued for ten minutes, and during that time the 1st Battalion of this regiment moved up and formed for the "jump-off". In making this move the 1st Battalion lost one hundred men killed and wounded by the enemy counterbattery work. At 5:30 A.M. the rolling barrage began, followed closely by the 1st Battalion. The 74th Company of this battalion was on the right and the 73rd Company on the left of the front wave, with the 75th Company in support, the 95th Company being attached to the liaison detachment. Each of the two front line companies had a platoon of the 73rd Machine Gun Company attached. After advancing a short distance the front line was held up by machine gun nests in a little patch of woods just south of St. Georges, this woods seemingly not having been touched by Allied artillery fire. It was in overcoming this resistance that Captain Overton, in command of the 76th Company and an officer who had been through every action and distinguished himself every time, lost his life. During the whole first kilometer of the advance the enemy offered a very fierce resistance with machine gun and artillery fire, but by following the barrage closely and fighting with their customary dash and bravery the troops succeeded in taking the hill just south of the Landres-St. Georges road, which proved to be one of the enemy's principal lines of resistance. Upon arrival at the first objective, at 8 A.M., the 3rd and 2nd Battalions passed through the 1st Battalion, in the order named, and the 1st Battalion followed as reserve battalion. At 8:14 A.M. the commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion sent the following message:

"From: Commanding Officer, Third Battalion.
To: Commanding Officer, Sixth Regiment.

My two leading companies are on 1st objective. Following companies on ridge in position to advance at proper time. Few casualties. Barker is near me. Have met two companies of Williams' back of St. Georges. Made good time since last message.

G. K. Shuler."

While the companies were being reorganized and the 3rd Battalion was taking up the front line, the Allied barrage remained stationary in front of this regiment's position. There was little enemy artillery fire, the enemy at that time being engaged in moving back his guns. The troops took advantage of the beautiful clear day to snatch a half hour's rest before continuing the advance. At 9:00 A.M. the 3rd Battalion resumed the advance as the leading battalion, closely following the barrage until the second objective was reached at 12:30 P.M. At 11 A.M. the following message was sent:

"From: Commanding Officer, Third Battalion.
To: Commanding Officer, Sixth Regiment.

We are in Chennery and Bayonville and passing up to second objective. Took about 100 prisoners here by using tank, assisted by riflemen. About 100 enemy retreated from their guns to woods south-east of Sivry. The woods north of second objective should be well-shelled. Have taken 6 - 88's. Scouts just reported that we hold Chennery and Bayonville. Enemy is shelling from wood north of Bayonville. G. K. Shuler."

The tanks assigned to this regiment gave great assistance in reducing enemy machine gun nests. Three tanks assigned to the 3rd Battalion, after the first objective had been reached, were assigned by the battalion commander to the 83rd Company. These tanks moved forward when the second advance began and kept up with the leading elements. Upon reaching the outskirts of Chennery, and while under the cover of the crest of a hill, it was found possible to maneuver the 83rd Company and tanks to flank a battery of four enemy 77 mm. guns. This battery was firing direct fire into the left of this regimental sector, and was taken completely by surprise from their left flank. One tank approached and covered the advance of a squad of riflemen and the skillful use of its one-pounder and riflemen's weapons compelled the surrender of one officer and seventy-five artillerymen who were manning the battery. As a result of this operation over two hundred of the enemy, from different points of

the ravine, were observed retreating on the run to the wood north-east of Sivry. The three tanks upon attainment of the second objective went forward with the 2nd Battalion when the 2nd Battalion passed through the 3rd. Officers in charge of the tanks cooperated in every way possible. The town of Bayonville was taken and organized, one hundred prisoners being taken. Under the charge of Major Schmidt, a captured medical officer, three German ambulances were put in operation, evacuating both American and German wounded after they had been properly cared for. Captain Arold W. Jacobsen organized the town and supervised these operations.

When the second objective was reached the 2nd and 1st Battalions passed through the 3rd Battalion, which followed as reserve battalion. The 2nd Battalion continued to its objective about three kilometers further. Upon arrival at the final objective patrols went forward to the exploitation line and met very little resistance. At 3:15 P.M. the following message was sent by the C.O. of the 2nd Battalion to Regimental Headquarters:

"We are on our objective. Front companies are adjusting line and sending exploiting parties ahead. Have liaison with Major Stowell on left and have sent to 5th on right. Considerable machine gun fire being encountered from that part of the Bois-de-la-Folie still held by the enemy. Casualties among the men not extremely heavy - officers about fifty per cent. Williams."

During the advance Captain Kirt Greene, 80th Company, was killed.

The Regimental Headquarters was moved to Sommerance soon after the attack commenced, and when the first objective was reached the Headquarters moved again to Forme d'en Dela, from whence it moved to Chennery. The day of November 2nd was spent in strengthening the position and reconnoitering the area to the front. The 79th Company was pushed forward to the northern edge of the Bois-de-la-Folie on the morning of November 2nd, to the north side of the Nouart road. No serious resistance was met in this movement, but the 96th Company on the left was held up by machine gun and one-pounder fire from the vicinity of Fme. de Maumes. On the night of November 2nd-3rd the 23rd Infantry passed through this regiment and took up the advance toward the exploitation line. This regiment followed as support in column of battalions in the following order: 2nd Battalion, 1st Battalion and 3rd Battalion, with a thousand yards between battalions. On November 2nd Major Barker was evacuated to the hospital on account of sickness, being succeeded in command by Major Maurice S. Berry.

The 3rd Brigade reached its objective at 8 A.M., this regiment being in support went into bivouac in the following positions: 2nd Battalion in woods a kilometer and a half northwest of Fosse; the 1st Battalion a half kilometer north of Fosse; and the 3rd Battalion in the ravine half a kilometer southwest of Fosse. Regimental Headquarters moved from Chennery to Fosse on the morning of November 3rd. In accordance with Operations Memorandum No. 30, Headquarters Fourth Brigade, dated 4 November 1918, the liaison detachment under command of Major Stowell rejoined this regiment, and Major Stowell assumed command of the 1st Battalion. The afternoon and night of November 3rd were spent in this position. The kitchens were brought up and the men given hot food. On the afternoon of November 4th this regiment moved to the Belval Bois des Dames area where it was held in support of the 5th Regiment, which was then holding the right subsector of the divisional front. The regiment remained in this area until after the 7th of November.

While in this area the constant exposure to the cold and rain caused much sickness among the troops and resulted in such a great number of evacuations that the effective fighting strength of the regiment was reduced to approximately one thousand men. The fact that the advance was to be pushed in a vigorous manner had necessitated orders that the men leave their packs behind. During the advance, however, most of the troops had salvaged some blankets and

extra clothing, but the several days of rain had made it practically impossible for them to spend a moment's time in comfortable rest or sleep since the attack started on the morning of November 1st. On the afternoon of November 7th the regiment marched to Bois de Sommeauthe and Regimental Headquarters were established in Sommeauthe on November 8th.

Upon arrival at Sommeauthe the Regimental Commander held a conference with the battalion commanders and explained to them the plan for the proposed crossing of the Meuse river, on the night November 8th-9th. In accordance with orders from the 4th Brigade Headquarters, November 8th, this crossing was postponed until the night of November 9th-10th, and the battalions were marched to the woods southwest of Thibaudine Farm where they bivouaced for the night. On the afternoon of November 9th, in compliance with telephonic instructions from Headquarters 4th Brigade, the battalions were marched to Bois du Fond de Limon, where they were held in readiness to make the crossing at daybreak on the morning of the 10th. This crossing was postponed and the troops went into bivouac. At 8:30 A.M. on November 10th the Regimental Commander and Lieut. Colonel Holcomb went to Brigade Headquarters, at Beaumont, to attend a conference relative to the proposed crossing of the Meuse. Upon completion of this conference the battalion commanders were assembled at the Regimental P.C. and to them was explained the tentative plan of the crossing, which was to take place at 9:30 P.M. that night. The Brigade order for the crossing was received at 5:50 P.M. and copies were sent to the battalion commander in Bois de Fond de Limon. The battalions were on the march within ten minutes after the receipt of these orders. The enemy was shelling the roads leading to the bridge positions and the troops were forced to make a detour of about a half kilometer, the leading battalion reaching the railroad yard near the river bank at 10:30 P.M., where they were met by an officer of the 2nd Engineers who stated that one bridge was on the river bank ready to be put in position, but that the other bridge was not yet in readiness. He stated that the enemy had apparently located the bridge positions and had them well covered with machine guns. Major George K. Shuler, of the 3rd Battalion, after a conference with the other battalion commanders, detailed forty men to help the engineers, and sent the engineer lieutenant to the river bank to report when both the bridges were in position. Battalion commanders waited until 4:00 A.M. of November 11th and as the second bridge was not ready at that time the troops were marched back to Bois du Fond de Limon as the day was breaking and there was no suitable cover for the troops in the vicinity of the bridge.

In compliance with telephonic instructions from Headquarters, 5th Army Corps, transmitted through Headquarters, 4th Brigade, hostilities ceased at 11:00 A.M., November 11th.

The most immediate effect that the signing of the armistice had upon the physical comfort of the men was that they were permitted to keep warming fires going night and day without fear of enemy observation.

In addition to the many evacuations on account of sickness this regiment lost during the Argonne-Meuse operations, from November 1st to November 11th, inclusive, twenty-seven officers killed and wounded and four hundred and thirty-six men killed and wounded. The regiment captured great numbers of prisoners, cannon, machine guns, stores and war material of every description. A number of horses were also captured. The Allied artillery had inflicted terrible damage upon the enemy draft stock. The great number of dead horses which had not been struck also indicated that the rapidity with which the enemy retreated had caused many of the animals to die from exhaustion. Great quantities of ammunition were left behind by the enemy.

The morning of the 12th of November found this regiment in support of the 23rd Infantry, which was holding the front line of the 2nd Division on the west bank of the Meuse River from the village of Le Faubourg to Villomonty. The disposition of the regiment was as follows: Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company at Yoneq;

the 1st Battalion, 73rd M.G. Company, 2nd and 3rd Battalions in the Bois du Fond de Limon; the Supply Company at Beaufort. On the afternoon of the 12th the 2nd Battalion was sent to La Basace to salvage the battlefield in that vicinity. On the morning of November 13th the 3rd Battalion of this regiment relieved the battalion of the 23rd Infantry which was holding the front line. The disposition of the battalion was as follows: Two companies at La Faubourg and two companies at Villemontry. Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company moved to Villemontry on the afternoon of the 13th of November. On the morning of the 14th the 1st Battalion of the 308th Regiment relieved the two companies of this regiment which were stationed at La Faubourg. Upon being relieved these two companies proceeded to Villemontry, where they were billeted. The regiment remained in this area until the morning of November 17th.

At 7 A.M. on the morning of November 17th this regiment, as part of the main body of Column No. 2, 2nd Division took up the march to the Rhine. Route of march: Pouilly - Inor - Olizy - Olizy-sur-Chieis - La Ferte. The entire regiment was billeted for the night in the town of La Ferte.

The regiment resumed the march to the Rhine at 7:30 A.M. of November 18th, route of march: Margut - Villers - La Soye. The regiment was billeted as follows: Regimental Headquarters at Bellefontaine; the 3rd Battalion and Supply Company at La Hage; 1st and 2nd Battalions at Tintigny. On the morning of this day the regiment crossed the border into Belgium. The regimental band played and the troops were given a rousing welcome by the inhabitants who lined both sides of the road.

On the morning of November 20th this regiment passed through the 5th Regiment and continued the march as Advance Guard of Column No. 2. Route of march: Etalle - Vance - Arlons. The regiment was billeted for the night as follows: Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 73rd M.G. Co. at Arlons; 2nd Battalion at Tontelange; 1st company of the 3rd Battalion at Frassern; three companies and Headquarters of the 3rd Battalion and Supply Company at Bontert.

The march was resumed on the morning of November 21st. Route of march: Oberpallen - Beckerich - Nordingen - Ewelingen, Luxembourg. The regiment was billeted for the night as follows: Regimental Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 73rd M.G. Company and Supply Company at Ewelingen; 2nd Battalion at Pratt; 3 companies of the 3rd Battalion at Schandel; 1 company of the 3rd Battalion at Bowingen. About this time approximately one thousand replacements joined the regiment.

The march was resumed at 7:30 A.M. on the morning of November 22nd. Route of march: Useldingen - Bowingen - Bissen - Berg. The regiment was billeted for the night as follows: Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 73rd M.G. Company and Supply Company at Nieder-Schieren; 3 companies of the 3rd Battalion at Crutchen; 1 company of the 3rd Battalion at Schronndweiler; 2nd Battalion at Etterbruck.

The march was again resumed on the morning of November 23rd. Route of march: Schronndweiler - Medernach - Ermsdorf - Eppeldorf. The completion of this day's march brought the regiment to the German frontier, which according to the terms of the armistice, could not be crossed until December 1st. An outpost line was established on the west bank of the Sauer River and strong guards were placed at all bridges in order that no persons should be allowed to cross the river into Germany. In addition to these outposts, frequent patrols were made along the bank of the Sauer River from Dillengen to Reisdorf. The regiment was billeted for the night as follows: Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company, Supply Company, 1 company of the 3rd Battalion and 2 companies of the 1st Battalion, at Befortersheid; two companies of the 1st Battalion and 73rd M.G. Company at Bigelbach; 2nd Battalion at Reisdorf; 3 Companies of the 3rd Battalion at Dillingen. The following day, November 24th, owing to the scarcity of billets in the Regimental area, the 1st Battalion was withdrawn from the outpost line and sent to Vostroff, where it was held as regimental reserve; Battalion Headquarters and two companies of the 2nd Battalion were sent to Bigelbach; Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company and Supply Company moved to Reisdorf. On November 25th the 97th

Company joined the 84th Company at Reiofthorpe in order to relieve the congestion of billets in Dillingen. The regiment remained in this area until December 1st, during which time drills were held daily, all equipment and transportation were thoroughly cleaned and overhauled and men and animals were given a much-needed rest.

On the morning of December 1st, after supporting the 5th Regiment in its crossing of the Sauer River, this regiment followed the 5th Regiment as main body of Column No. 2, 2nd Division, in the march toward the Rhine. Route of march: Wallendorf - Goichlingen - Rouerburg - Waxweiler. Regimental Headquarters crossed the Sauer River into Germany at about 9:00 A.M. of December 1st. The regiment was billeted for the night as follows: Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company and Supply Company at Amdeltingen; 2 companies of the 1st Battalion at Neurath; Battalion Headquarters and 2 Companies of the 1st Battalion at Heilbach; 2nd Battalion at Simmelbaux; Battalion Headquarters and 2 companies of the 3rd Battalion at Plaschied; 2 companies of the 3rd Battalion at Scheurin; 73rd M.G. Company at Heilbach.

The march was resumed on the morning of December 2nd. Route of march: Waxweiler - Lunzbach. The regiment billeted for the night as follows: Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company, Supply Company, 1st Battalion and 73rd M.G. Company at Lunzbach; Battalion Headquarters and 2 companies of the 2nd Battalion at Heilhausen; 2 companies of the 2nd Battalion at Pintesfeld; Battalion Headquarters and 2 companies of the 3rd Battalion at Labertsburg; 1 company of the 3rd Battalion at Greimelscheid; 1 company of the 3rd Battalion at Hargarten.

The march was again resumed on the morning of December 3rd. Route of march: Bronsgold - Prum - Budesheim. Troops of the regiment were billeted for the night as follows: Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company and Supply Company at Rommersheim; Battalion Headquarters and 2 companies of the 2nd Battalion at Gendenbrett; 2 companies of the 2nd Battalion at Waschied; 3rd Battalion at Giesdorf; 1st Battalion and 73rd M.G. Company at Fleringen. On December 4th the 2nd Division remained in place and the Regimental Commander, realizing that the march for December 5th was to be an unusually long one, obtained permission to make the following troop movements in order to shorten the following day's march: Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company and Supply Company from Rommersheim to Wallersheim; Battalion Headquarters and 2 companies of the 2nd Battalion from Gendenbrett to Gondelsheim; 2 companies of the 2nd Battalion from Waschied to Weinsheim; 3rd Battalion from Giesdorf to Duppach. 1st Battalion and 73rd M.G. Company remained in place at Fleringen.

On the morning of December 5th this regiment passed through the 5th Regiment and took up the march as advance guard of Column No. 2, 2nd Division. Route of march: Shortest available route. The regiment was billeted for the night as follows: Regimental Headquarters, Supply Company, 2nd Battalion and 3rd Battalion at Hillesheim; Headquarters Company at Wallesdorf; 1st Battalion at Berndorf; 73rd M.G. Company at Berndorf.

The march was again resumed on the morning of December 6th. Route of march: Wiesbaum - Dollendorf - Udelhoven. The regiment was billeted for the night as follows: Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company, Battalion Headquarters and 3 companies of the 2nd Battalion and the Supply Company at Dollendorf; Battalion Headquarters and 3 companies of the 1st Battalion at Lodersdorf; 1 company of the 1st Battalion and 73rd M.G. Co. at Nieder Eho; Battalion Headquarters and 2 companies of the 3rd Battalion at Udelhoven; 2 companies of the 3rd Battalion at Anchutte; 1 company of the 2nd Battalion at Hungersdorf.

The march was resumed on the morning of December 7th. Route of march: Weisbaum - Udelhoven - Antweiler - Schuld. The Regiment was billeted for the night as follows: Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company, Supply Company, 1st Battalion and 73rd M.G. Company at Schuld; 2nd Battalion Headquarters and 2 companies of that battalion at Fuchshoven; 2 companies of the 2nd Battalion at Winnerath; Battalion Headquarters and 3 companies of the 3rd Battalion at Isul; 1 company of the 3rd Battalion at Duppelfeld.

The march was continued on the morning of December 8th. Route

of march: Antweiler - Sch... - Ahrweiler. The troops were billeted for the night as follows: Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company, Supply Company, 3rd Battalion, Battalion Headquarters and 3 companies of the 2nd Battalion, Battalion Headquarters and 3 companies of the 1st Battalion and the 73rd M.G. Company at Neuenahr; 1 company of the 2nd Battalion and 1 platoon machine guns at Limersdorf; 1 company of the 1st Battalion and 1 platoon machine guns at Schelkenbach.

On the morning of December 9th this regiment resumed the march. Route of march: Neuenahr - Sinzig - Brohl. Upon arrival at destination an outpost line was established on the west bank of the Rhine from Niederbreisig to Nenedy. The regiment was billeted as follows: Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company, 3rd Battalion, Headquarters and 2 companies of the 2nd Battalion and 2 platoons of the 81st M.G. Company at Brohl; the 1st Battalion and 73rd M.G. Company at Nenedy; 2 companies of the 2nd Battalion and 1 platoon of the 81st M.G. Company at Niederbreisig; the Supply Company two kilometers north of Brohl on the Brohl-Sinzig road. On the afternoon of December 10th the 74th Company of the 1st Battalion was sent to Andernach to establish a liaison post there with the 32nd Division, which was on our right. In addition to the outposts the entire western bank of the Rhine was patrolled from Niederbreisig to Andernach. The regiment remained in this area for four days, during which time drills were held daily.

On the morning of December 13th this regiment crossed the Rhine River and took up position in support of the 5th Regiment in the 4th Brigade sector of the Coblenz bridgehead. The disposition of the troops of this regiment was as follows: Regimental Headquarters at G...; Headquarters Company, Supply Company and 2nd Battalion at Rheinbrohl; 3rd Battalion at Leutesdorf; Battalion Headquarters and two companies of the 1st Battalion at Niederhammerstein; one company of the 1st Battalion at Oberhammerstein; one company of the 1st Battalion and the 73rd M.G. Company at Leutesdorf.

On December 16th this regiment took over the left half of the 4th Brigade subsector with the following disposition of troops: The 1st Battalion holding the front line with Battalion Headquarters, 73rd M.G. Company, 75th Company and 3 platoons of the 74th Company stationed in Honningen; 95th Company at Honborn Farm; 2 platoons of the 76th Company at Ariendorf; 1 platoon of the 74th Company as liaison platoon with the 5th Regiment at Bremscheid; 2 platoons of the 76th Company at outposts Nos. 1, 2 and 3 on outpost line; the 2nd Battalion in support of the 1st Battalion and billeted in Rheinbrohl; the 3rd Battalion as regimental reserve, at Leutesdorf; Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters Company at Leutesdorf; Supply Company one kilometer north of Leutesdorf on the Leutesdorf-Brohl road.

In addition to the outposts established on the observation line, guards were placed at all ferry landings and railroad stations and frequent patrols made along the banks of the Rhine. Work was immediately started on the defenses of the sector, front line trenches pegged in and machine gun positions located. A drill schedule has been drawn up and is being strictly adhered to.

A number of theatre buildings have been taken over and various regimental and divisional entertainment troupes, as well as entertainers of this regiment, make possible amusement of this form practically every night; athletics, including boxing and football are encouraged; a certain percentage of the men are given excursions on boats provided by the Corps, to points of interest on the Rhine; liberties to Coblenz and other large towns are granted to a certain percentage of the men of the regiment each week. The men are well billeted, practically all sleeping in beds, and food is plentiful and good.

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
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